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ABSTRACT
PATRICK WINSTON KELSO: Winston Churchill and Social Reform
(Under the direction of Frederick Laurenzo)

The purpose of this Senior Honors Thesis is to examine the role of Winston Churchill
in regards to social reform in Twentieth Century Britain. Although many books have been
written on Churchill’s life, few specifically speak to his role in domestic politics. Often
times Churchill’s role as Prime Minister during World War II overshadows his lengthy
m
parliamentary career. This study will attempt to explain the role Winston Churchill played i__
domestic politics in respect to social reform and the rise of the British welfare state.
Biographies, academic journal articles, books, memoirs, speeches, archival material, as well
as books by the subject have been used to gather information to provide a thorough
investigation of the subject matter.
During his career Churchill held many key positions within the British government.
Both his actions and inactions help to explain where he stood in terms of social reform and
his views on the role of government within society. This thesis covers three periods of
Winston’s Churchill’s life tracing his involvement in social reform throughout his political
career. His father’s political ideology, the political climate of the day, and the ever-changing
industrial society are some of the major issues which affected Churchill s domestic politics.
This thesis seeks to explain the rationale behind a man who spent his early years as a Liberal
reformer and his latter years as a Conservative statesman. This work also seeks to examine

IV

the motivation and evaluate the genuineness of Churchill’s work in respect to social reform
suggesting that although sometimes convenient for political purposes his interest in this
sphere was real and contributory to the British society.
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Introduction

The public perception of Winston Churchill’s political career is often dominated by
his role as Prime Minister during World War II. His political career, however, spanned the
period from his election to Parliament in 1900 to his resignation in 1964 during which he
held numerous positions and wielded considerable influence upon British domestic politics,
The emergence ofthe British welfare state coincides with his own progress in the political
realm where he served as a key player in social reform alongside Herbert Asquith and David
Lloyd George during a time often referred to as his “radical phase.

Contrary to common

belief, Churchill changed very little from his early political stance on social issues but
adapted to the ever-changing historical context which saw him become the leader of the
Conservative Party. The inexhaustible body of work chronicling Churchill s life gives
enormous insight to the man; yet both the volume of information and his complexity also
make it difficult to make a concrete assessment of his place in British politics. As Paul
Addison explains, Winston Churchill was a politician who traveled all the way from the left
wing of the Liberal party to the right wing of the Conservatives, to become in the end a
symbol and embodiment of national unity.”
Winston Churchill first entered Parliament in 1900 as a member of the Tory Party
following an early career in the military. After serving four years as a backbencher Churchill

'Paul Addison,“The Three Careers of Winston CharchsW:' Transactions ofthe Royal
Historical Society 11, 185. Churchill’s role in domestic politics, most specifically
concerning social reform, is a topic few have focused on as much as Addison. This study
therefore will often cite his work in regards to this issue.
1

crossed the floor joining the Liberal party over the issue of free trade. This early switch in
party affiliation would symbolize Churchill’s independence in party politics, often
considering himselfto be above the patty fray. As a Liberal MP he attacked the
Conservatives and the House of Lords with his biting rhetoric seen by many as an assault on
the upper class. The Liberal majority enabled Churchill during this “radical phase,” to serve
in several capacities under which he advocated measures of social reform. At the Board of
Trade Churchill pushed for unemployment insurance, land reform, and a minimum wage. In
1909 he embarked upon a campaign defending the failed 1909 Budget in which he lauded its
reforms and castigated the House of Lords in speeches given throughout Britain. As Home
Secretary Churchill addressed the penal system aiming to rectify the inequalities m
sentencing with respect to class.
With his appointment to the Admiralty in 1911 many argue Winston Churchill
abandoned his radical tendencies and inclinations towards social reform. Beginning with the
post at the Admiralty and continuing into World War I it is obvious that social reform took a
backseat to wartime concerns for Churchill. By the wars end anti-socialist concepts and
warnings became his platform. In 1924 Churchill returned to the Conservative party where
he would remain the rest of his political career. In the Baldwin Government he served as
Chancellor ofthe Exchequer in which, despite his party constraints, was able to pass the
. As leader of the
Widows, Orphans, and Old Age Pensions Bill expanding social insurance
coalition government during World War II Churchill faced wartime concerns and domestic
politics. More often than not the war took precedence over

social concerns in Churchill’s

mind. The 1942 Beveridge Report forced Churchill to announce

his “Four Year Plan” which

was never enacted due to the Labour victory in 1945. With his second administration in

2

1951 Churchill presided over a new welfare state, courtesy ofthe post-war Labour party,
which bridged his liberal past with the future direction of Britain.
This abridged resume of Winston Churchill’s political career hardly scratches the
surface in exploring the man and his philosophy concerning the role of government in
society. On the surface, the political career of Winston Churchill appears to be filled with
ideological contradictions, opportunistic moves, and personal ambition. Yet beyond this
public front exists a man who considered himself consistent during a time of great political
change. Churchill’s initial switch to the Liberal party in

1905 and his later return to the

Conservative party in 1924 cloud his political ideology and evoke the question whether
Churchill himself changed or the political context in Britain changed. Beneath the surface of
this ideological consistency question lie the speeches and legislative legwork of the emerging,
British welfare state that he was a part of.
The sincerity of Churchill’s concern for those targeted in Liberal reforms comes to
question. Bentley Gilbert distinguishes differences in “social politics and social policy
with the first being a breakdown in agreement upon social policy and the latter being
“attitudes so well understood by the effective governing class that they scarcely need
discussion.”^ Was Churchill playing social politics

or truly involved in genuine social

policy? The answer to this question is not straightforward but is apparent within his writing,
The issue in which young Churchill chose to express

so fearlessly during his liberal phase

was that of responsible government and rights of the British people to not be left helpless by
their government. The concept of Churchill as a statesman plays upon his call for social
reform while his role as politician hints at mitigating problems concerning the poor rather

^ Bentley Gilbert, British Social Policy: 1914-1939, 305.
3

than overhauling the system in place. The cause of poverty and the ways in which
government could stop it served as the concern

of the liberal Churchill. Possibly naive in his

early years, this liberal phase shows an untainted and idealistic view of government. It can
be argued that Churchill later became aware of the political game and had to abandon his
idealism for party loyalty and constraint. Nevertheless, this time of Liberalism fosters
rhetoric condemning the House of Lords as a legislative body while pushing democratic
concepts that leave no social problem outside the realm of the government budget. It is with
Churchill’s switch back to the Conservative party and his apparent abandonment of liberal
ideas that brings one to question his reasons for involvement within social welfare and
whether or not his philosophy changes.
for him to favor social
The background of Winston Churchill provides several reasons
reform. At first glance it seems rather odd for someone to show an active concern for the
poor’s welfare when they were bom in Blenheim Palace. It is agreed upon by many that his
nanny, Ms. Anne Everest, had a profound effect upon his concern for the elderly and the
poor. After she was fired from Blenheim Palace when young Winston was a boy, he became
outraged and felt a personal responsibility to financially support his surrogate mother in her
old age.^ Henry George’s Progress and Poverty and Seebolm Rowntree’s Poverty: A Study
ofTown Life are also thought to have shaped his mind early on in terms of government
responsibility in alleviating poverty.^ Not being a product of public schools or Oxbridge,
Winston Churchill seemed to sit in limbo between the upper class and the working class.

^ Blenheim Palace is the gift home of Winston Churchill’s ancestor, the 1 Duke of
Marlborough, for his military triumph over the French.
● / j x
^ Paul Addison,‘Churchill and Social Reform’ in Robert Blake and W.R. Louis (eds.),
Churchill^ 77.
^ Malcolm Hill, Churchill: His Radical Decade, 54,72.
4

Although he never could identify with the working class, it is possible that this transitory
state allowed him to foster obligation or at least inclination to help his fellow Britons.
A study of Churchill’s personality also sheds insight into the political role in which he
played. Roy Jenkins contends that Churchill was instinctively for the underdog especially
when he could remain a top dog.^ Churchill operated in broad terms in both his rhetoric and
action never reducing himself to trivial or minute details. He often times spotted an
opportunity and seized it as his own devoting his entire energy upon this one specific topic.
Lloyd George once remarked that

Winston is like a torpedo. The first you hear of his

doings is when you hear the swish ofthe torpedo dashing through the water,

He operated

on his own intuition and on his own terms. Other than his tenure during World War II, the
personality of Winston Churchill created distrust between people of all parties. Churchill’s
concept of“Tory Democracy,” embodied in his mind by his father, elevated him in his eyes
above party lines to focus on the concerns ofthe nation as a

whole. These ever-changing
a certain

concerns cloud the man and his legacy, yet leave ample evidence behind to suggest
degree of the ideological consistency in which he claimed to possess.
Winston Churchill played an integral role in building the foundation of the British
welfare state. During a half-century’s service he sat in seats of great power shaping the
future of British society. Both his personality and the political context of the day must be
understood to give any picture of a man beyond the archetypal wartime figure embedded in
people’s minds. Only then may his true impact on the domestic side be seen.

^ Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography, 33.
^ Paul Addison,“The Three Careers of Winston Churchill,” 194.

5

Chapter I
Early Years and the Liberal Phase

Winston Churchill first came to Parliament in 1900 as a member ofthe Tory party
with a military background including most recently active service during the Boer War where
he also gained a reputation as a war correspondent. He possessed noble and Tory roots as the
son of the late Lord Randolph Churchill, second son of the Duke of Marlborough, and a
former Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Tory party. Churchill campaigned for the
Parliamentary seat in Oldham during the Khaki Election of 1900 as a pro-war Tory who saw
the Boer War as both “just and necessary,

Fresh from South Africa, the young Churchill

had become a young star within the Conservative Party which used him to rouse votes for
their cause. His first address to the House of Commons was a prepared response to David
Lloyd George’s speech concerning the Boer War. In his remarks Churchill stated, ...and if
>»2

I were a Boer, I hope I should be fighting in the field....

This thought did not go over well

with the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, yet Churchill himself believed this gained
the favor of the Liberal Lloyd George. Most of his speeches from the Conservative bench
centered on South Africa, but they were oddly non-partisan in that they defended the
government by using arguments that appealed to the Opposition. In many respects he
played to both crowds, possibly as an intentional move to

avoid making enemies within

Parliament on either side. Churchill claimed during his first years in the House of Commons

Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life, 358.
^ Ibid., 365-366.
^ Ibid., 367.
6

that he had the privilege of meeting with Conservative leaders but felt that men such as
Rosebery, Asquith, Grey, and especially John Morley were more like-minded with him. In
his book My Early Life published in 1930, Churchill addresses this topic stating that:
I became anxious to make the Conservative party follow Liberal courses. I was in
revolt against ‘jingoism.’ I had a sentimental view about the Boers. I found myself
differing from both parties in various ways, and I was so untutored as to suppose that
all I had to do was to think out what was right and express it fearlessly. I thought tlmt
loyalty in this outweighed all other loyalties. I did not understand the importance o
party discipline and unity, and the sacrifices of opinion which may lawfully be made
in their cause.^
The restrictions which party unity demanded did not sit well with Churchill s personality.
Throughout his life he possessed enormous ambition and a belief in personal destiny which
was not defined by simple party lines. In accordance with this characteristic Churchill, along
with Lord Percy, Lord Hugh Cecil, Ian Malcolm, and Arthur Stanley formed a Parliamentary
dinner group named after Lord Hugh Cecil called “The Hooligans who invited guests and
discussed the group’s brand of politics unrestricted by party divisions. This progressive
environment allowed Churchill to discuss opinions with colleagues and sharpen his political
views. One such guest of“The Hooligans” in the spring of 1902 was Joseph Chamberlain
who insinuated to the group that party members should always support their party and in
leaving hinted that knowledge of tariffs would be beneficial to them in the near future.
The issue of protectionism in the form of tariffs indeed became the new parliamentary
issue as Chamberlain had predicted due to his own action, and it served as a pivotal issue
dividing Churchill and the Conservative Party until 1904 when he left the party. Since the
repeal of the Com Laws in 1846 the concept of free trade had been the fundamental doctrine

^ Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life^ 368.
^ Ibid., 370.
^ Malcolm Hill, Churchill: His Radical Decade^ 72.
7

of the British economy.^ Free trade allowed food to be imported from across the world at a
low price to feed the British people. However, as competition in manufacturing increased
from other nations the concept of protectionism began to gain support throughout the latter
part of the 19th century. Lord Randolph as Chancellor ofthe Exchequer had briefly toyed
with protectionism before reverting to the doctrine of free trade,

In 1903 Chamberlain

proposed tariffs to provide new revenue and promote unity within the British Empire and its
colonies. Churchill opposed this tariff reform as soon as it went public by announcing that:
The old Conservative Party, which contained many protectionists wdth its religious
convictions and constitutional principles will disappear and a new party ^11 arise
will turn on tariffs and who will cause
rigid, materialistic and secular, whose opinions
^
the lobbies to be crowded with the touts of protected industnes.

Sir Francis Mowatt from the Treasury helped brief Churchill on the concepts of free trade.
Along with sixty other conservative MPs, including Lord Hugh Cecil, Churchill became a
‘Tree Fooder,” meaning a Tory who supported free trade after the repeal of the Com Laws.
His speeches during this time alluded to the 19^*^ Century free trade leader Richard Cobden
10

and the accomplishments free trade had produced for the country,
The reasons behind Churchill’s backing of this cause are perhaps a mixture of his ovm
liberal inclinations and the influence of his father’s political ideology. In an 1897 letter to his
mother while stationed in India Churchill wrote,
I am a Liberal in all but name. My views excite the pious horror of the Mess.
Were it not for Home Rule - to which I will never consent - I would enter Parliament
as a Liberal. As it is — Tory Democracy will have to be the standard under which I

^ Paul Addison, Churchill: The Unexpected Hero, 33.
^ Ibid., 33.
^ Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 22 June, 1903.
10
Malcolm Hill, Churchill: His Radical Decade, 8.
8

11

shall range myself.

This “Tory Democracy,” which Churchill claimed, was a concept of his father’s that Lord
Randolph had developed during his own parliamentary career. Lord Randolph Churchill
explained his concept of“Tory Democracy” in a paradoxical fashion as both

a democracy
12

which supports the Tory party’ and a government inspired ‘by lofty and by liberal ideas.
Paul Addison explains that the concept “was a resonant phrase, suggestive of a long-term
strategy, but defined by Lord Randolph in so many different ways,for so many different
tactical purposes, as to empty it of all meaning beyond the need for daring and unashamed
13

opportunism,

In his first failed attempt at seeking a seat for Oldham only 2 years after his

father’s death, Churchill campaigned declaring:
I regard the improvement of the condition of the British people as the main end of
modem government. I shall therefore promote to the best of my ability
^
which, without impairing that tremendous energy of production on which the wealth ot
the nation and the good of the people depend, may yet raise the standard com ort an
happiness in English homes.

Churchill not only held deep admiration for his father but also set out to defend his
father’s career from his political critics. In March of 1901 the Conservative Secretary for
War, St John Brodrick, announced plans to increase the standing army by 50 per cent and
thereby greatly increasing the cost of maintaining this army. Though seemingly a strange
move for a person with a military background, Churchill opposed this idea stating in a note to
the Liberal Sir William Harcourt that “I hate and abominate all this expediture [sic] on

11

Winston S. Churchill, Chartwell Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, CHAR 28/23/3133A
12

Roland Quinault,“Churchill and Democracy,” Transactions ofthe Royal Historical
Society 11, 202.
13
Paul Addison, Churchill: The Unexpected Hero, 21.
14
Paul Addison, Churchill on the Home Front 1900-1955, 11.
9

15

It had been his father’s attempts to cut military spending that had led

military armament,

16

to his resignation in 1886.

This move by the Conservative government prompted Churchill

to ally with the Liberals where he gave a speech in May 1901 lambasting the proposals and
criticizing the concept of militarism declaring,“The Wars of peoples will be more terrible
«17

than the wars of kings.
Opposing the Conservative Party’s plan for military expansion did not settle well
within the Tory circle; yet it would be the issue free trade which brought Churchill s early
Conservative career to its demise. Churchill saw the abandonment of free trade as an
abandonment of bedrock Tory policy. He held that he was upholding the principle of free
at
trade and following in the footsteps of his father, whose biography he had begun wnting
18

the time.

Churchill had begun a balancing act between the Conservatives and Liberals

which had been noticed by both sides ofthe leadership following Chamberlain s May 1903
introduction of“tariff reform.” Later in August of the same year Chamberlain, in a letter to
Churchill, stated that there was “not much room ... for a dissident Tory in politics, but
Heaven knows that the other side stands most in need [of] new talent, and I expect you will
19

drift there before long.

After being barred from the “Conservative Club of North

Chadderford Churchill responded in the Manchester Guardian: “I am an English Liberal. I
„20

hate the Tory party, their men, their words and their methods,

It is historian Malcolm

Hill’s contention that Free Trade brought Churchill to the Liberal Party; yet once switching
he embraced their land taxation and other policies under the idea that “free trade and taxation

15
16

Paul Addison, Churchill: The Unexpected Hero, 30.

Ibid., 30.

17

Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Winston Churchill: Complete Speeches 7(1974), 78.
Paul Addison, Churchill: The Unexpected Hero, 34.
19
Winston S. Churchill, Chartwell Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, CHAR 2/8, 57.
20
Malcolm Hill, Churchill: His Radical Decade, 15.
18

10

21

99

Charles

are necessary for people to hold politicians within democratic disciplines.
Trevelyan, a Liberal MP, wrote to Churchill on December 31, 1903, asking if he would join
his cause in pushing a bill concerning land value taxation to relieve local taxation. Churchill
responded witli interest and hinted that Trevelyan might have to give him lessons on the
22

topic."

He also checked out Henry George’s Progress and Poverty, which advocated land
23

taxation on the premise that the community creates the value of land and not the landowner.
In January 1904 the Conservative Party censured Churchill for “scurrilous statements
against His Majesty Edward VII” no doubt as a result of his stray from the party fold. He
retorted that; “This appears to me to be utter nonsense; and I challenge the members of your
committee to produce the slightest shadow offoundation in any speech of mine for such a
„24

ridiculous and abominable charge,

The groundwork was set for Churchill s break from

the Tories. On May 31"‘ 1904, the young MP walked into the House of Commons, paused at
the Bar, then sat next to Lloyd George on the liberal benches in the comer seat below the
Opposition gangway where his father had insulted Gladstone. Churchill did this twice within
25

the same day in a deliberate and noticeable fashion.
The explanation for Churchill’s surprising switch in parties is rooted within his past
and his personality. The aforementioned notion that Churchill was the heir of his father s
politics made the party switch all the more easier. Similar to his father he was a Tory of
radical sympathies treated unkindly by his own party’s leadership. Churchill displayed
ambivalence” in his attitude towards party politics from the start of his political career thus

21

Malcolm Hill, Churchill: His Radical Decade^ 26,30.
Ibid., 34.
23
Ibid., 30-31.
24
Ibid., 18.
25
Ibid., 20.

22

11

aiding him in making such a move as this. Paul Addison holds that egotism was the true
creed of Churchill, as he was known to voice an opinion on almost every issue. He would
never think of consulting the party seeing that party politics put a constraint on great
statesmen. His ideal political setup as explained to Lord Rosebery in 1902 was a
C4

Government ofthe Middle ... free at once from the sordid selfishness and callousness of

Toryism on the one hand, and the blind appetites ofthe Radical masses on the other

. His

switch to the Liberal Party made Conservatives think of him as an opportunist while making
26

Liberals wary of his class and military background,

Keith Robbins contends that his switch

appears to be primarily over the issue of free trade while Churchill also recognized there was
no possibility for rapid advancement under Balfour while the Conservatives were losing their
27

control of the government.

During a speech given in June of 1904 at Alexandra Palace,

Churchill addressed his party change and ideological consistency. He stated that.
Men change, manners change, customs change. Governments and Prime Ministers
change, even Colonial Secretaries (Chamberlain) — sometimes they change their
offices, sometimes they change their opinions. But principles do not change.
Whatever was scientifically true in the economic propositions which were e^ablished
sixty years ago in a far greater generation than our own is just as true in 1904 as it
was in 1846, and it will still be true so long as men remain trading animals on the
28
habitable globe.

His father’s concept of“Tory Democracy” also helped Churchill justify this change
of allegieunce during his early years in Parliament. Churchill wrote after his father s death in
1895: 44 4 All my dreams of companionship, of entering Parliament at his side and in his
support, were ended. There remained for me only to pursue his aims and vindicate his

26

Paul Addison,“The Three Careers of Winston Churchill,” Transactions ofthe Royal
Historical Society 11, 188.
27
Keith Robbins, Churchill, 33.
28
Malcolm Hill, Churchill: His Radical Decade, 22.
12

29

memory.

Pressing ahead with the writing of his father’s biography. Lord Randolph

Churchill, helped Churchill put the criticism of both his father and himself behind him. The
work emphasized his father’s discovery of this “Tory Democracy” and its ability to rest
30

British politics on political divisions rather than social.

Victor Feske holds that, “[Lord
31

Randolph’s] blazing of a path to the frontier legitimized his son’s later crossing over.
Churchill claimed that Tories had been corrupted by the “irretrievable catastrophe” his father
sought to prevent. He could therefore assert “Tory Democracy” under the popular cause of
Liberalism as he concluded in Lord Randolph Churchill by appealing to an England that was
32

beyond party itself, a common theme he would play up throughout his political life,

Tory

democracy had impressed Churchill with two concepts on social policy. First, social reform
446

was essential for Britain to maintain its overseas power. Churchill himself stated that.

to

keep our Empire we must have a free people and an educated and well-fed people. That is
why we are in favour of social reform,

This attitude, known as “social imperialism, was
„33

prevalent in the late 19^ and early 20^ centuries,

Secondly, Churchill saw that the only
34

way to secure the workingman’s vote for the party was to protect his interests,

Violence

had been the manner in which the workingman stressed his economic dissatisfaction prior to
the turn of the century where financial assistance was given out of fear. After 1885 the
workingman was given the vote and this new more literate electorate caught the eye of the

29
30
31

Violet Bonham Carter, Winston Churchill: An Intimate Portrait, 10.
Keith Robbins, Churchill, 34.
Victor Feske, From Belloc to Churchill, 192.

32

Keith Robbins, C/iwrc/?///, 35.
●
z:
Paul Addison,“Winston Churchill and Social Reform,” Modern History Review 6, 10.
34
Ibid., 10.

33
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35

parties.

A good economic period around the turn ofthe century temporarily halted

unemployment problems. Yet by 1903, unemployment began to increase and by 1905 trade36

union unemployment was at a ten-year high,

A problem existed and the party to rectify this

situation would capitalize politically in a big way.
Now on board with the Liberal Party, Winston Churchill set out to become a player in
British politics combining concepts of“Tory Democracy” with his newfound Liberalism.
Lucy Masterman, daughter ofthe Liberal politician and journalist C.F.G. Masterman, is
6

quoted as saying that Churchill

was full ofthe poor whom he had just discovered. He
●J9937

thinks he is called by providence — to do something for them,

The idea ofliberalism and

the causes that it embraced became of great interest to Churchill. However, at this early
stage, the young parliamentarian did not completely understand all tenets of liberalism.
Malcolm Hill believes that Churchill did not subscribe fully to the thinking ofthe liberal
statesman and his friend, John Morley, at this time. Morley felt that if poverty were
reformed, mitigation or minor relief measures were unnecessary. Churchill recognized the
distinction between the two but saw nothing wrong in mitigation measures coupled with
fundamental reform. Morley gave Churchill a copy of Seebolm Rowntree’s Poverty: A Case
Study of Town Life in 1901, which introduced him to the problems of poverty and increased
his awareness of those problems in Britain itself.

38

Churchill wrote an unpublished review of

Rowntree’s study in York intended for an army periodical which stated that, “... strange as it

35

Bentley Gilbert, “Winston Churchill versus the Webbs: The Origins of British
Unemployment Insurance,” The American Historical Review 71, 847-848.
36
Ibid., 847.
37
Malcolm Hill, Churchill: His Radical Decade, 72.
38

Ibid., 72.
14

may seem, eccentric, almost incredible to write- our Imperial reputation is actually involved
,.39

in their condition.

On December 4, 1905, Balfour and the Conservative government resigned without a
defeat in the Commons hoping to let the Liberals lose the trust of the people and thereby
regaining power in the long run. Churchill turned down the position of Financial Secretary at
the Treasury in Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s new government preferring instead to be
Under-Secretary for the Colonies. Lord Elgin sat in the Lords as Secretary of State for the
40

Colonies allowing Churchill to lead in the Commons,

This position was very advantageous

for him due to the issue of South Africa dominating current political debate and his personal
involvement and knowledge of the situation. In this post Churchill was also responsive to
collectivism and the “new liberalism” on social reform. The politically active and socialist
couple Beatrice and Sydney Webb began to influence his thoughts and rhetoric during this
time. Borrowing phrases from the two, Churchill made speeches demanding a
41

minimum’ standard of life and labour.

national

While giving a speech in Glasgow as Under

secretary for the Colonies in October of 1906 he stepped outside the realm of his position.
After a brief piece on South Africa, Churchill launched into the “New Liberalism s points of
state responsibility for the sick, the elderly, and children. He warned that a Labour Party
would split progressives only helping the Tory Party in the end. He also advocated a poverty
line under which no one should be allowed to live. This type of speech was designed to
express Churchill’s genuineness in his switch to the Liberal Party and stress that he was not

39

Paul Addison,‘Churchill and Social Reform’ in Robert Blake and W.R. Louis (eds.).
Churchill^ 58.
40
Malcolm Hill, Churchill: His Radical Decade^ 24.
41
Paul Addison,“Winston Churchill and Social Refoim,” 10.
15

restricted to strictly colonial matters.'^" Paul Addison credits Churchill's conversion to
collectivism and social reform to his change of party and the direction of radical friends and
influences. The old Liberals pushed laissez-faire where the New Liberals favored state
intervention as their doctrine. Ofthese radical friends and influences, C.P. Scott (editor of
the Manchester Guardian), H. W. Massingham (editor ofthe Nation), Beatrice and Sydney
Webb,and Charles Masterman all wielded considerable influence in shaping ChurchilTs
43

liberal ideas.

It was the Webbs who had invited the young Winston Churchill to dine at 41

Grosvenor Road where they drew his preoccupation with imperial issues to the political
44

importance of social legislation.
ChurchilTs personality also aided him in his ascendancy in British politics during this
time period. His youthful attitude and capacity to speedily take in new information enabled
him as a successful writer and educated politician. He schooled himself in the topics ofthe
day becoming familiar with all available material on his subject of interest."^^ Concerning
the psychology of the man, British psychiatrist Anthony Storr felt ChurchilTs character
matched Jung’s description ofthe “extraverted intuitive” psychological type. This type
describes a person who is “never to be found among the generally recognized reality values,
?«46

but is always present where possibilities exist,

Lucy Masterman noted in her father’s

biography that, ChurchilTs “cabinet colleagues. Grey and Birrell, feared that ‘the tendency in
him to see first the rhetorical potentialities of any policy was growing and becoming a real

42

Keith Robbins, Churchill, 38.
Paul Addison,‘Churchill and Social Reform’ in Robert Blake and W.R. Louis (eds.),
Churchill, 60.
44
Bentley Gilbert,“Winston Churchill versus the Webbs,” 850.
45
Paul Addison,“The Three Careers of Winston Churchill,” 186.
46
Ibid., 187.
43
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intellectual and moral danger,

The ambitious Churchill took British politics head on with

his newly-found party and the platform which it provided.
The general election of 1906 presented a unique opportunity for Churchill to further
embrace Liberalism. He moved from Oldham to Manchester North-West as a Liberal
candidate where free trade was ever so popular. His Tory opponent distributed a pamphlet
listing his public remarks previously as a Tory hoping to play up Churchill s apparently
conflicting past. Churchill, in dramatic fashion, threw the pamphlet on the ground at a rally
48

denouncing his old cause and igniting the crowd in his favor,

His platform during the 1906

general election for Manchester was: free trade, religious equality, public control of
education, reduction of expense on armaments, the taxation of land values, trade union law
reform, and licensing reform.

49

The election provided the Liberal Party with 377 seats.

Unionists 157, Irish Nationalists got 83, and Labour got 53. Balfour lost his seat by 2000
votes in Manchester North-East to one of the 300 new MPs, but he soon afterwards filled a
vacated seat intended for him.

50

Churchill continued as Under-Secretary for the Colonies

under Campbell-Bannerman’s newly elected government which, due to their secure majority,
expected to push their legislative program through the Commons.
The legislative program of the Liberal Party met opposition from the Conservative
House of Lords during 1906. An education bill pushing for public control of elementary
schools with public funding, a plural voting bill that would eliminate multiple votes, an aliens
bill that sought control of foreign labor during stressful economic times. Agricultural

47
48
49
50

Paul Addison, “The Three Careers of Winston Churchill,” 187.
Malcolm Hill, Churchill: His Radical Decade, 40.
Ibid., 40-41.
Ibid., 42.
17

51

Holdings, and the Town Tenants Act for Ireland were all rejected by the higher chamber.
Churchill and the other members of the Liberal Party became enraged that the House of
Lords would thwart what they saw as the will of the people. Churchill stated in 1906 that:
Mr. Balfour is no longer Prime Minister of this country. He sits in Opposition, in a
lonely, solitary place on the left behind the Speaker’s chair. But he has power. He
has power to write a note ... and give it to a messenger and send it 200 y^ds dovsrn
the corridor to the House of Lords. And by writing that note, he can mutilate or reject
or pass into law any clause or any bill which the House of Commons may have spent
several weeks discussing ...
Churchill was made a Privy Councilor in May of 1907 and a year later named to the cabinet
as President of the Board of Trade due to reshuffling after the death of Campbell-Bannerman.
Churchill wanted to remain Under-Secretary for the Colonies but was instead considered for
the Admiralty and then the Local Government Board. When offered the Local Government
Board he responded saying,‘T refuse to be shut up in a soup kitchen with Mrs. Sidney
53

Webb. Consequently he took over Lloyd George’s former post at the Board of Trade.
The by-election, required when an appointment to the cabinet takes place, saw Churchill
defeated by 429 votes in Manchester North-West. H.G. Wells would brand his victorious
it i

opponent, Joynson-Hicks, after the election as
„54

obscure and ineffectual nobody.’

an entirely undistinguished man ... an

Churchill’s liberalism had gone too far for his

constituents in Manchester North-West. After this loss he was offered a more liberal-leaning
55

seat in Dundee, which he easily won on May 9, 1908.
Many of the ministers saw Churchill as he came to the helm of the Board of Trade as
overly ambitious and a young “Napoleon.” He undoubtedly wanted to ascend in power yet
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56

was careful to be efficient in his work and not to irritate his superiors,

It is debatable

whether his strategy was calculated or more of an instinctive action performed by Churchill.
The debate over Churchill’s genuineness as a social reformer at the Board of Trade does little
to change the fact that his actions produced positive results in tackling unemployment.
Alluding to his accomplishments at the Board of Trade, William Beveridge would later claim
,57

that “unemployment [reform] was the handiwork of Churchill,

Bentley Gilbert contends

that although the Webbs introduced Churchill to the principles of social reform during their
two-year courtship, his ascendancy to the Board of Trade marked the end of their influence.
Churchill, with the help of Charles Masterman, Undersecretary at the Local Government
Board, and John Bums,the President of the Local Government Board, ushered in

a new
58

phase of Liberal reform where unemployment insurance would serve as the cornerstone.
By the spring of 1908 the Liberal Party needed a new prograrri to regain their
weakening momentum. Issues such as Old-age pensions and school feeding programs had
been discussed in the past and were advocated by reformers in all parties, yet the continuing
issue of idle workmen stricken with unemployment still proved to be a problem within
59

Britain.

In March of 1908 Churchill wrote in The Nation that social reform was “the

untrodden field of politics.” The idea of treating problems concerning the poor and
unemployed using a scientific approach stemmed from the Webb’s influence and became
60

part of his cause.

He wrote in his article:

...attempts to grapple with the evils of unemployment must be concerted
departments. Youth must be educated and disciplined and trained from 14 to 1». 1 ne
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exploitation of Boy Labour must be absolutely stopped. The Army must be made to
afford a life-long career of State Employment ... Means must be found by which the
State can, within certain limits, and for short periods, augment the demand for the
ordinary market for unskilled labour so far as to counterbalance the oscillations of
world-trade. Underneath, but not in substitution for, the immense disjointed fabric of
social safeguards and insurance which has grown up by itself in England, there must
be — at a low level — a sort of Germanized network of state intervention and
61

regulation.

His common sense view drove his reform ideas favoring action over mere abstract
discussion of the topic. He also convinced himself that leveling was needed but not
62

necessarily full equality,

Churchill sought a more practical approach to alleviating the

unemployment problem than had been used in the past. Since the riots of 1886 it had been
the practice to employ idle hands in public parks, roads, and forests to aid unemployment.
The Unemployed Workmen Act of 1905 was passed by the Balfour government in response
to growing unemployment numbers and allowed temporary public works programs to
employ those unemployed. This act initiated artificial work by the government to control the
unemployment problem during harsh economic times. This approach did not prove very
effective in solving the unemployment problem within Britain. William Beveridge would
later note in his study Unemployment: A Problem ofIndustry(1909)that artificial work was
63

doomed to fail due to the real problem being underemployment and not unemployment.
This concept explains that it was not a case of many workers suddenly losing their jobs but
that many workers found the period between jobs longer and their standard of living falling
below the subsistence level.
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The idea of unemployment insurance departed from this artificial work concept and
proved much more effective for those in need. Bentley Gilbert maintains that it is
unimportant whether Churchill or Lloyd George had the first idea of unemployment
64

insurance, the responsibility for the scheme was all Churchill s.

Contrary to others, Gilbert

claims that Churchill was the “sole active representative of social reform in the cabinet
65

while Lloyd George battled over the 1909 Budget and the Lords veto,
began planning ideas for unemployment insurance

The Board of Trade

without official cabinet sanction in the fall

of 1908. A committee was established after unemployment rose on October 14, 1908. The
Trades Union Congress study of Germany found the German insurance of workmen had no
66

ill effects on their trade unions,

After trade-union unemploymentjumped in September to

the highest rate since 1886(9.8%)and 46 people in London starved during the previous
winter, Churchill saw the need to take action. He wrote to Herbert Asquith stating.
The need is urgent and the moment ripe. Germany with a harder climate and far less
accumulated wealth, has managed to establish tolerant basic conditions for er
people. We are organized for nothing except party politics. The Minister who will
apply to this country successful experiences of Germany in Social Organization may
or may not be supported at the polls, but he will at least have left a memona w ic
time will not deface of his administration. It is not impossible to underpin the
existing voluntary agencies by a comprehensive system — necess^ily
- of state action. We have at least two years. We have the miseries which this winter
is inflicting on the poor classes to back us.^^

At the Board of Trade Churchill sponsored unemployment insurance, labour
exchanges, and statutory minimum wages in the ‘sweated trades.’ Although not original
ideas, he provided the muscle to push such legislation while advocating their necessity to the
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68

country.

It was Churchill who called for legislation prior to the 1909 report of the Royal

Commission on the Poor Law and convinced Asquith and the Cabinet to go along. He was
the first to introduce unemployment insurance into parliament and it would later be
69

implemented with the National Insurance Act of 1911.

Churchill saw these reform

measures as alternatives to Socialism. They were to prevent extreme poverty for specific
groups not necessarily for all. He claimed during his by-election campaign in May 1908 that,
. Socialism
Socialism seeks to pull down wealth.Liberalism seeks to raise up poverty ..

£4

would kill enterprise; Liberalism would rescue enterprise from the trammels of privilege and
70

preference,

In a way,the reform measures were conservative in nature explaining why the
71

leaders of the Conservative Party welcomed the reforms,

He presented ideas in moderate

and conservative terms such as stressing that giving the working class a vested interest in
72

society kept property secure and avoided conflict.
The relationship between Churchill and Lloyd George made the two a formidable pair
during this radical phase. Asquith relied heavily on Lloyd George and Churchill to devise
policies concerning taxation and welfare since he specialized chiefly on free trade and legal
matters. Churchill found that carefully writing an argument which Asquith could read at his
73

leisure helped to gain approval eind in turn influence within the cabinet,
74

primarily on ideas where Lloyd George focused on strategic politics.

68

Churchill focused

Although Churchill
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remained one of the few to call him “David,” the two men developed a sort of a rivalry
75

through the years,

Their rivalry embedded political competitiveness in terms oftaking both

action and credit for ideas. After arriving to Parliament and the Board of Trade late,
representing Dundee when defeated earlier in Manchester, Churchill remarked, I have got to
«76

this pie too late; Lloyd George has pulled out all the plums,

Their relationship however

would mature as the two men began working together on issues of social reform and their
subsequent Budget in 1909. Churchill immediately took up the leftover cause ofthe Miners’
Eight Hour Bill from the Home Secretary. This bill aimed to limit workers’ hours to eight
and gave Churchill a chance to champion the worker’s plight by arguing that they should
have times of leisure and family socializing in daylight, as well as time to read and work in
77

their gardens.

Both Lloyd George and Churchill were committed to expensive moves in

social reform such as pensions, labour exchanges, and unemployment insurance. Like his
father, Churchill wanted to limit military spending and in fact had his own office in the War
Office where he could access files which, as the government’s self-appointed war veteran
78

advisor,” helped him argue his point for restraining military expenditures.

Churchill and

Lloyd George wanted the production of dreadnoughts reduced from eight to four citing them
as a waste when Germany had no aims at war. The Liberal government reduced the number
79

of dreadnoughts produced in part due to the two men’s urging; yet not to their ideal four.
Asquith began to show concern over Churchill’s manner of crusading for a specific
cause with such intensity and capriciousness. Lloyd George remarked during this time that
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Churchill was like “a chauffeur who apparently perfectly sane and drives with great skill for
»80

months, then suddenly takes you over a precipice.

Despite this skepticism, Churchill

remained determined in his fight for social reform at this time. In effect he saw this as a
worthy way to go down even if the party failed: “I say-thrust a big slice of Bismarckianism
over the whole underside of our industrial system, and await the consequences, whatever
,81

they may be, with a good conscience.’

Churchill was determined to let the cabinet know

that reform meant more than home rule, pubs,the House of Lords, and that striving for the
Germsm program did not mean militarily speaking. He

never admitted welfare was to

improve the character of the poor. There is a striking difference in the philosophy ofsocial
insurance between Churchill and the Webb’s. In his eyes social insurance might never
concern itself with causes but only the shortcomings of economics. The Webbs belie
until insurance could be applied to all who wanted it, the workingman could be trained to
82

avoid habits that could cause poverty until the prior system

was abolished.

In contrast,

Churchill was interested in freedom for the individual. Bentley Gilbert states “Churchill’s
preoccupation was rather with the fate of the sinner than with the possibility of redemption.
In a letter to Llewellyn Smith on June 6,1909, Churchill states,
I do not feel convinced that we are entitled to refuse benefit to a qualified man who
loses his employment through drunkenness. He has paid his contn utions, ® ^
insured himself against unemployment,and I thii^ it arguable
oresig
should be rewarded irrespective of the cause of his dismissal .... ur concern is wi
evil, not with the causes. With the fact of unemployment, not with the character ot
83
the unemployed.
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This attitude towards social reform prompted Churchill and Lloyd George to take
governmental action. In April 1909 Churchill introduced a Trade Boards Act that covered
200,000 workers of whom 140,000 were women and children. A board comprised of
employers and employees, within and outside ofthe trade, would sit for each individual trade
84

and set minimum pay for each,

Bentley Gilbert contends that,“Unemployment insurance

was the handiwork of Churchill. It constitutes, perhaps, the major legislative justification for
,85

his reiterated claim that he was, at heart, a social reformer.

By this time Churchill had

departed from his previous notions of welfare taught to him by his mentors, the Webbs. His
gambler persona allowed him to push a program

that others could have failed at doing. The

Webbs had taught him the concept of a national minimum which was

manifested in the Trade
86

Boards Act of 1909 but he pushed forward the effort with his own political intuition.
major contribution to the base of the welfare state came

A

with his scheme for compulsory

unemployment insurance and for labour exchanges. With the suggestion of Beatrice and
Sidney Webb, Churchill hired the 29-year-old William Beveridge, a future economist and
social reformer, and the two worked on what was to become the Labour Exchanges Act of
87

1909 which called for the extension oflabour exchanges to all parts of Britain,

Although

this was not enacted until 1911 due to politics, the groundwork for labour exchanges and
unemployment insurance was laid by both the young Beveridge and Churchill. Despite the
fact that John Bums,the President of the Local Government Board, treated Churchill s
Labour Exchange Bill in May 1909 with little sympathy,the first exchanges opened by
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February 1910 and by the time the National Insurance Act of 1911 passed there were 414 in
88

existence.

In addition to the Labour Exchanges Act of 1909, Churchill became involved in the
infamous 1909 Budget. After the rejection of the Licensing Bill in November 1908 by the
House of Lords, Churchill and other Liberal Party members became furious. The Liberal
Party had lost several by-elections and the upper chamber continued to prevent them from
89

running a government by holding up and vetoing legislation.

Asquith wanted Lloyd

George to propose a budget that would enliven the mid session for the liberals. Uniomsts
had gained several seats in the past few by-elections thereby weakening the political capital
of the Liberal Party. An enlivening and radical budget that addressed social problems was
not foreseen to ignite a war between the House of Commons and the House of Lords but this
90

is indeed what occurred.

The House of Lords, long dominated by Conservatives, had

begun to anger Liberals by vetoing money-related legislation. The constitutional question
thus came to the forefront of British politics at this time as to what extent the Lords should
have a say in money matters. It is in this context that Churchill announced. We shall send
them such a Budget as shall terrify them,they have started a class war,they had better be
„91

careful.

Lloyd George summarized the budget of 1909 known as the People s Budget

stating:
This is a War Budget. It is for raising money to wage implacable warfare against
poverty and squalidness. 1 cannot help hoping and believing that before this
generation has passed away we shall have advanced a great step towards that
time when poverty and wretchedness and human degradation which always follow m
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its camp will be as remote to the people of this country as the wolves which once
infested its forests.^"
A Budget Protest League was formed by Unionist Walter Long thereby prompting the
Liberal Party to form a countering Budget League with Churchill being elected its President.
As a platform speaker, he avoided speaking too much on details but relied on his rhetorical
abilities to address the overall scheme and necessity ofthe Budget.^^ The Budget League
headed by Churchill was a massive organization holding thousands of meetings while
distributing 17 million leaflets and 680,000 posters. Malcolm Hill believes that having a
captive political audience and a grand political idea greatly enlivened Churchill and provided
94

an alternative to the boring debate on the Budget within the House of Commons,

Churchill

set out on a speaking tour late in 1909 advocating the People’s Budget and hoping that he
would elicit a mandate in the upcoming general election in 1910.
Speaking at Leicester in 1909 Churchill highlighted what he considered to be the
greatest danger to Britain. He proclaimed:
The greatest danger to the British empire and to the British people is not to be found
among the enormous fleets and armies of the European Continent... No it is here in
our midst, close at home,close at hand in the vast growing cities of England ^d
Scotland, and in the dwindling and cramped villages of our denuded countryside. It is
there you will find the seeds of Imperial ruin and national decay — the unnatural gap
between rich and poor, the divorce of the people from the land, the want of proper
discipline and training in our youth, the exploitation of boy labour, the physical
degeneration which seems to follow so swiftly on civilized poverty, the awful
jumbles of an obsolete Poor Law ... the absence ofany established minimum
standard of life and comfort among the workers, and, at the other end, the swift
increase of vulgar,joyless luxury - here are the enemies of Britain.
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This ‘‘unnatural gap” as Churchill called it was the social and economic chasm which
Liberals hoped the People’s Budget could begin to close. Those who sat “at the other end” m
their lavishness could be found in the impeding House of Lords. Churchill often spoke of
democratic ideals casting the House of Commons as the voice ofthe people while invoking a
usurper image for the House of Lords. Lord Curzon, who followed Churchill from town to
town disputing the tenets of his speeches, advocated the Lord s position. He advocated the
experience and professionalism, which the Lords felt they offered the British people as
96

opposed to the House of Commons,

The shots fired between the two men often proved

entertaining. Lord Curzon once stated that,“The upkeep of all civilizations has been the hard
work of aristocracies.

Mr. Churchill countered stating:

Again I say this only needs to be stated to be dismissed as absurd. All
has been the work of aristocracies.’ It would be much more^true to say
of aristocracies has been the hard work of all civilizations.

e up eep

Churchill’s speech given in Edinburgh on July 17,1909, is thought by Malcolm Hill
to be one of the most radical from a frontbench Minister concerning taxation in British
history.^^ In his speech Churchill advocated the ideas of Henry George who argued that land
value is created by the community and therefore belongs to the community. Churchill
received a rebuke by the King, himself, when he prophesized the dissolution of Parliament if
the Lords rejected the Budget.^^ Obviously, angering the King was not the strategy which
the party had in mind. Churchill’s later speeches in Lancashire prompted Asquith to write
the royal private secretary pointing out Churchill’s moderate tone so
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as to prevent another

100

royal rebuke,

During this campaign Churchill, pursuing his constant theme of broad

vision, often spoke on principles that the budget did not address. The budget was rejected by
the end of November 1909 and the political climate within Britain became increasingly tense
due to the constitutional crisis concerning the House of Lords. Two subsequent elections
took place following the Lords’ rejection ofthe 1909 Budget.
was
After the Liberal Party’s victory in the first General Election of 1910, Churchill
offered the Irish Office. Faced with the burden oftraveling and the continuous Home Rule
101

issue, he turned this position down opting for the Home Office.

Churchill’s stint as Home

Secretary was to be a pivotal period in the shaping of his future political life and his publ
reputation. The job of Home Secretary had the inescapable problem of always balancing
102

liberty and order.

Paul Addison notes, interestingly enough,that Churchill’s brief tenure at

the Home Office was “radical in both directions” in that “he extended the boundaries of
»103

liberty and order in a series of bold strokes,

On one end ofthe spectrum Churchill s

efforts towards penal reform showed his leniency and practical approach towards the just*
system causing him to be seen as the prisoner’s friend. His handling oflaw and order, most
especially the suffragist movement and worker strikes, clouded his reform measures at the
same time. At this other end ofthe spectrum was an alter ego hidden from the public eye and
prompting Churchill to contribute to the formation ofthe emerging British secret state and
104

intelligence gathering services.
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After his promotion in January of 1910, Churchill immediately proposed
comprehensive penal reform. In regard to the British penal system his main goal was to
reduce the social bias of the courts against the poor and those ofthe lower class. Petty
cnmes were the most common in Britain and were mostly committed by the poor who faced
almost certain imprisonment. Those with three convictions or more could be put in
“preventative detention” for up to ten years under the Gladstone Era laws. As Home
Secretary, Churchill did not wait for mercy pleas but searched individual cases to find
105

disproportionate rulings.
As Home Secretary Churchill attempted to use the power inherent in his office. He
favored the Webbs idea of compulsory labour colonies for vagrants and formulated his own
idea of‘defaulters’ drill” which would have put convicted minors to work in police
106

stations,

Although these concepts were never enacted during his brief tenure, he did grant

. Unlike
reprieve to 21 of 43 death sentences, which sat above the normal trend for reprieves
the complicated nature of labour policy, Churchill felt he understood the prison system. This
107

In

enthusiasm can undoubtedly be linked to his experience in prison during the Boer War.
My Early Life Churchill writes,“I certainly hated my captivity more than I have ever hated
any other period in my whole life ... Looking back on those days I have always felt the
108

keenest pity for prisoners and captives,

Although he was unable to legislate in this

position due to his short tenure, Churchill exercised the royal prerogative by varying
sentences of many prisoners(he was to report to the king but the king always took the
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advice). He used his administrative powers to improve the treatment of political pnsoners
(chiefly suffragettes) and limit solitary confinement. Many felt his actions would undermine
the deterrent powers of the system currently in place. Churchiirs Permanent Secretary, Sir
Edward Troup, claimed that,“‘He nearly drives me crazy at times but he’s the first great
Home Secretary we’ve had since Asquith ... Anyone can use the ideas already in the Office.
,109

9 9

He brings ideas to the Office.
During his tenure at the Home Office Churchill also was forced to deal with social
issues such as the Women’s Suffrage movement. As previously mentioned Churchill used
his powers as Home Secretary to improve prison conditions, and this was especially true for
suffragettes. Yet one must not forget he, himself, was a product of Victorian England and
held the opinion that women were inferior to men. Churchill denounced a suffrage bill in
July, 1910, but on a technicality so as not to appear completely against the movement.
Suffragists sought to vote on the same terms that men had; yet the current law stipulated that
only heads of households had the existing franchise. The bill in 1910 would have then
enfranchised only single or widowed property owning women, who would probably be more
inclined to vote conservative. The “democratic” argument, which opposed the
enfranchisement of a minority group of women,can be seen as a convenient strategem for
no Churchill as well as many other
many Liberals who were opposed to female suffrage,
politicians of the time tended to grow angry when Emmeline Pankhurst’s Women s Social
and Political Union began disrupting political rallies and adopting militant tactics as early as
1905. His opinion towaid women in politics remained negative throughout his liberal phase
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and onward. Churchill was noted in a 1912 Cabinet meeting as stating. We already have
111

enough ignorant voters and don’t want anymore.
Perhaps the area in which Churchill is best remembered during his tenure at the Home
Office is his management of the working class and the reactions to the threat ofthe strike.
With respect to his handling of specific strikes and riots as Home Secretary, Churchill has
garnered a mixed assessment from both his political contemporaries and historians alike.
The events which occurred under Churchill’s watch cloud his record and tend to overshadow
his accomplishments as Home Secretary. The first accusations of Churchill as an aggressor
stemmed from an incident in November of 1910. Metropolitan Police used rough tactics and
injured several women at a suffragette rally at Westminster. Although Churchill was not
“personally responsible for the dubbed “Black Friday” he refused to call for an inquiry and
refuted allegations against the Metropolitan Police. A few days after this incident a strike by
miners broke out in a south Wales coalfield employed by the Cambrian Colliery. A rioter
was killed by police during the strike in Tonypandy, a nearby town in the coal-mimng
112

Rhondda Valley,

The local authorities wanted the Home Office to dispatch troops to

maintain the peace, but Churchill worried that doing so could escalate the problem. He
therefore initially sent the Metropolitan police. A day later the riots continued and Churchill
was forced to dispatch troops and allow the police to act as a buffer. He was politically
lambasted by the Labour leader Keir Hardie for condoning the forcefulness of the troops and
to
the legend grew (with the help of later misconstrued events)that Churchill ordered troops

111
112

Paul Addison, Winston Churchill: The Unexpected Hero, 50.
Geoffrey Best, Churchill: A Study in Greatness, 40.
32

113

shoot at the striking miners,

After receiving harsh criticism from the Conservatives for

displaying “undue leniency" Churchill addressed Parliament stating.
Law and order must be preserved, but I am confident that the House will agree with
me that it is a great object of public policy to avoid a collision between soldiers and
crowds of persons engaged in industrial disputes ... For soldiers to fire on the peop e
would be a catastrophe in our national life, for the Minister who is responsible to run
some risk of broken heads or broken windows ... to accept direct responsibility in
order that the shedding of British blood by British soldiers may be averted, as, thank
God, it has been successfully averted in South Wales.
Incidents in the summer of 1911 coupled with Tonypandy further hurt Churchill’s
name. A dock strike escalated into a railway strike throughout the country. In many
people’s minds, especially Churchill’s, the strike created visions of a crippled nation starved
by “industrial anarchists.” He dispatched troops throughout the country giving them power
over the local authorities. In Llanelli troops shot and killed two men thereby prompting Keir
Hardy to accuse both Asquith and Churchill of intentionally sending troops to shoot and kill
strikers. Paul Addison explains that,“Together with Tonypandy,these events marked a
turning point in Churchill’s relations with the Labour party and the trade unions. His record
as a social reformer was eclipsed by his new reputation as class warrior with a ‘Prussian’
115

love of order imposed by military force.

Churchill attempted to improve his relations

with organized labour after the Tonypandy incident to some degree by promoting the Coal
Mines Act and the Shops Act in 1911 with some success, but he would never fully shed the
negative reputation that he had obtained.

113

Paul Addison, Winston Churchill: The Unexpected Hero, 53. The concept that Churchill
was “trigger-happy” is a constant theme which develops throughout his career and will be
further discussed within this work.
114
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates^ 1 February, 1911.
115
Paul Addison, Winston Churchill: The Unexpected Hero, 54.
33

Beyond his penal reform policies and his law and order record exist the efforts by
Churchill in helping form the secret state of defense gathering intelligence.

As Home

Secretary he authorized the new Secret Service Bureau (precursor to MIS) “to draw up a
register of thousands of enemy aliens to be arrested at the outbreak of war” without notifying
Members of Parliament or the public. Churchill’s position at the Home Office brought him
in contact with the intelligence service which was at the time worried about possible German
116

spies in the country,

Likewise he sponsored the Official Secrets Act passed through a half

empty Commons on a Friday afternoon in August of 1911 which remained in force until
1989. The Official Secrets Act made it an offense to disclose or receive official information
117

without authorization.

As one of the duties as Home Secretary, Churchill was required to briefthe King

on

situations in the Commons most specifically dealing with relations regarding the House of
Lords. These relations, especially for the Liberals, had grown sour over the recent years. In
February of 1910 Churchill wrote a Cabinet memo favoring total abolition ofthe House of
Lords and replacement by a newly elected assembly. In the House of Commons Churchill
stated that the House of Lords was:
... A weapon and engine, which has been used by one party to vex, harass ^d
humiliate and finally destroy tlie other and it has been used so cruelly, so violently,
and so bitterly in recent times that there is not a single man on these benches who wi
consent to hold office on these conditions, except for the sole and express purpose118
and with the reasonable hope of effecting a permanent change in these conditions.

Churchill had subscribed to the New Liberalism and the “progressive alliance with Labour
during his stint in the Liberal party. Yet due to the January 1910 General Election the
116
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political environment changed for the Liberal Party; it lost its majority and became
dependent upon the Irish Nationalist and Labour parties. The battle between the Commons
and the Lords took place and was completed with the Parliament Bill in 1911. Churchill had
hoped that the Liberal and Conservative parties would both grow towards the center after this
119

monumental step.

Lloyd George apparently told Churchill at this point that there were two

choices: either the Liberals and Conservatives would compromise over divisive issues, or
there would be a Liberal Government which would continue to expand progressive social
policy. At this point Churchill believed mutual agreement could be achieved between the
two major parties. He sought to reach common ground with Conservative counterparts such
as F.E. Smith by founding the “Other Club” in 1911 where both the Liberal and Conservative
120

whips were members,

Lloyd George in 1910 secretly expressed a desire for a coalition
121

government, an idea of which Churchill greatly approved,

This coalition however did not

materialize and time caused the two men’s relationship to begin to drift. In October of 1911
Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty, which forced him to focus most of his time
and efforts on naval affairs. Lloyd George remained Chancellor ofthe Exchequer to
122

what he and Churchill had done in terms of reform.

oversee

Lloyd George, seeing the people’s

point of view from below, continued his radicalism with the great land campaign of 19131914, whereas Churchill began to display a more and more a paternalistic approach favoring
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change in the social order from above,

The onset of World War I would halt Churchill’s

involvement with social reform and triggered a new stage in his political career.
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Chapter II
‘The Middle Years'

In October of 1911 Prime Minister Herbert Asquith offered the Admiralty to
Winston Churchill. Although the position was inferior to the Home Office in the
hierarchy of the cabinet, Churchill saw great potential in this post. By 1911 Churchill
had become a more bipartisan player between the Liberals and Conservatives. He and
F.E. Smith had founded “The Other Club” where members of all parties could be elected
to membership and discuss politics and political theory. The club put emphasis on
bipartisanship, yet it should be noted that no Labour Party member ever joined. Henry
Pelling contends that the club in fact turned out to be nothing more than an admiration
club for Churchill.^ The position of First Lord ofthe Admiralty undoubtedly made him
focus more closely on military aspects and the looming war rather than domestic issues
such as social reform. In many respects, this stage provides a political segue between
Churchill’s early radicalism and the political direction which he followed after the Great
War. The actions taken by Churchill during this period contributed to his public persona
and affected his political ambitions and capabilities throughout his subsequent career.
Churchill’s ever-changing relationship with both the Liberal and Conservative parties at
this time also help to explain his political position in his ensuing years.

'Henry Pelling, ‘Churchill and the Labour Movement’ in Robert Blake and W.R. Louis
(eds-), Churchill, 118.
Mbid., 118.
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There was a level of skepticism among politicians as Churchill assumed his
position at the Admiralty. The radical wing ofthe Liberal Party had hoped ChurchilTs
appointment to the Admiralty would signify a time where naval expenditures would be
cut thus freeing up revenue for other government programs.^ Others such as H.W.
Massingham were more suspicious of ChurchiH’s future as he wrote in the Nation in
January of 1912 that:
As Liberalism does not fund a war policy, so the value ofits contribution to the
true standard of national strength - which is the condition ofthe
®®
Britain - is lessened by this concentration on the fighting services. Mr. Chwchill
has his father’s impressionable temper; much of his youth was spent mi t e
pageantry of guns and marching armies; like Faust(and most of us), e resem es
the spirit which he comprehends, and which is nearest to him. Manchester
made him a radical reformer. What kind of political interest will ^o or ee
years at the Admiralty develop? He has a mind of incessant activity an great
acquisitive and receptive power; he likes to be at the centre ofthe brilliant y
lighted stage that the modem statesman treads; he is a specially close an
intelligent student of war. A careful director of party energies would like to see
him at a safer post."*
It would be Massingham’s assessment that proved more correct as Churchill slipped into
a more militaristic mindset in preparation for a looming war. On Febmary 8,1912 in
Glasgow, Churchill gave a speech as First Lord of the Admiralty in which he argued that
it is a necessity for Britain to maintain a large navy whereas for Germany it is only a
“luxury.” This sentiment, which drew heavy criticism from Germans, proved contrary to
his initial stand in 1909 and signaled his intentions and ambitions while at the Admiralty.
In 1912 he announced that Britain would maintain a sixty percent superiority over

^ Paul Addison, Winston Churchill: The Unexpected Hero^ 63.
^ Ibid., 63.
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Germany in dreadnoughts, the largest warships ofthe Royal Navy,and later expanded his
plan when Germany increased her production.^
Between 1913 and 1914 Churchill proposed the construction offour more
dreadnoughts. This was in fact the opposite of what the Liberals at the time wanted and
had expected Churchill to do at the Admiralty. In actuality Churchill did not intend to
build the four dreadnoughts but to hide from Germany the government decision to
abandon the 60 percent notion and their plan to build two battleships in place of
submarines.^ This move hurt him politically with the Liberal Party and to a degree
distanced him from the progressives; yet it proved an example of his ability as a military
strategist by successfully deceiving the German military. During his time at the
Admiralty, Churchill also made the monumental move of converting the British fleet
from coal to oil-fired engines and headed the government’s negotiations for the purchase
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to guarantee the oil supply.
With the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Churchill became preoccupied with
military matters thus putting aside domestic issues for the time being. Although social
reform served as a minimal topic during this period of his political life, his actions

as

First Lord of the Admiralty had a direct effect in shaping his political future. His
involvement and responsibility in the Dardanelles campaign damaged his career and
caused harsh criticism of his military capabilities even during World War II. The
Dardanelles served as an important strait separating Europe and Asia. If seized, it was
believed by the allies that the Ottoman Empire could be forced out of the war. Geoffrey

^ Paul Addison, Winston Churchill: The Unexpected Hero,63.
^ Ibid., 63.
Mbid., 61.
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Best explains,“The Dardanelles story is so complicated in itself that historians find it
impossible to come to the brisk and decisive judgements on it made by partisans at the
time and ever since.

Although the British Government backed the plan, it was

Churchill who received the overall blame for the expedition when it failed. Chtirchill had
been a major advocate for the use of Royal Navy battleships to capture the mined straits.
After failing to capture Gallipoli, public opinion and the government concluded that
Churchill was incompetent at his post. The Dardanelles debacle helped to push Churchill
out of the government’s favor. Lord Beaverbrook explains in his memoirs.
Here was a man of extraordinary abilities, of adroit debating strength, o
originality and resourcefulness. At the height of a major war he
^
employment. Yet the greater part of his career had been occupie wi
^
of a military kind. ... Instead he was extruded from the centre
lesser ability and initiative, and his knowledge and his inventiveness ot mi
were wasted. It was a time of grievous frustration for Churchill. Indeed, there
were days when he feared that all might be lost if his services were denied to
country.^
After his removal from the Admiralty Churchill found solace in oil painting, for
which he proved to have a natural talent. He also sought relief by pursuing active
military service. On January 4, 1916 Lieutenant Colonel Winston S. Churchill was pu
command of the 6^*^ Battalion of the Royal Scots Fusiliers. In this role he was
instrumental in implementing many similar reforms as he had done at the Home Office
10

The idea of

such as mitigating punishments and providing entertainment to his soldiers,
reforming everything seemed to be ever-present in the mind of Winston Churchill. As
with any person who displays great leadership qualities, he had to not only possess power
but also use this power to implement a degree of change. I believe his propensity to

^ Geoffrey Best, Churchill: A Study in Greatness, 64.
^ Beaverbrook, Men and Power: 1917-1918, 118.
10
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reform rested upon genuine concern as well as the romantic notion that his destiny was to
secure a place in history. Those who take action are those who are remembered. His
prewar reform measures as well as his attempt to penetrate the Dardanelles exemplify
bold actions that he hoped would stand the test oftime. The implementation of reform
measures within his Battalion offers a more human side where perhaps Churchill displays
a more pure and genuine belief in making life better without attempting to impact world
history. His action in this minor amelioration hints at a more genuine side to his reform
efforts in much larger arenas.
With his ouster from Whitehall, Churchill became an outspoken critic ofthe
government, especially in terms of the offensives in France. During the Coalition he sat
in the Opposition benches yet seldom voted against the Government. However, on May
10, 1917, Churchill opened a Secret Session debate for the Opposition where he was
critical of the government’s war plans in France. This speech prompted Lord
Beaverbrook to write in his memoirs,“Churchill could not be left out ofthe Government.
He must be fenced in, and that forthwith. What could not be squashed must be squared
and what could not be squared must be squashed.

After Churchill’s speech Lloyd

George delivered his own which was equally praised prompting the two to meet behind
the Speakers’ Chair. Churchill records in The World Crisis that:
In his satisfaction at the course the Debate had taken [the Prime Minister] ...
assured me of his determination to have me at his side. From that day, althoug
holding no office, I became to a large extent his colleague. He repeatedly
discussed with me every aspect of the war and many of his secret hopes and
12
fears.
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Through partial fear that Churchill would become leader ofthe Opposition against
the Coalition Government, Lloyd George pushed to make him Minister of Munitions in
13

1917.

During this time there was growing distrust of Churchiirs ambition and party

loyalty. Lloyd George asked Andrew Bonar Law,a Conservative member ofthe
coalition government at this time,“Is he [Churchill] more dangerous when he is FOR you
than when he is AGAINST you?” to which Bonar Law replied,“I would rather have him
14

against us every time.

His appointment to the Ministry of Munitions in July brought

about some public criticism. On August 3,1917,the Morning Post stated:

... that dangerous and uncertain quantity, Mr. Winston Churchill a floating
kidney in the body politic - is back again at Whitehall. We do not know in me
least what he may be up to, but from past experience we venture to suggest t at it
will be everything but his own business.
It must be noted that Churchill entered this post with a deliberate non-partisan stance that
undoubtedly aided him in regaining authority within the government. His previous party
to
switch and his ever-present penchant for self-promotion needed to be hidden if he was
remain a political player in Whitehall.
When not in France, Churchill’s work at the Munitions dealt heavily with labour
relations. Roy Jenkins holds that many would say he was not fit to handle this particular
duty due to lack his lack of experience and his temperament. He explains Churchill s
approach to the labour problems was a mixture ofthe sympathetic and authoritarian. He
was uncomfortable with the idea that workers could strike safely while soldiers were
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16

dying in France,

On August 15,1917, Churchill presented his Munitions of War Bill to

the House of Commons where he explained the aim ofthe Bill was ‘‘output on the one
hand and industrial peace on the other.” There would be special wage awards to those
that were skilled and no worker would be penalized ifthey belonged in a trade union

or

participated in a trade dispute. Churchill expressed that the war could not be won unless
17

we are supported by the great masses ofthe labouring classes ofthis country,

In a

more authoritarian manner, Churchill also persuaded Lloyd George to threaten
conscription to strikers in 1918, which proved quite effective in preventing further labour
18

disputes.

Churchill’s Ministerial post included over a million women workers under his
responsibility during this point in time. In November 1917, Churchill met for the first
time with the Women’s Trade Union Advisory Committee. Only eight months prior he
had voted in favor of the franchise extension to older and married women,and now he
heard their demands for fairer wages. In this meeting he proved to be quite sympathetic
to the women’s demands voiced by Ernest Bevin, who would later serve in Churchill s
War Cabinet. Churchill stated in the meeting that he believed women’s labour should be
more than “an incident of the war.” At the end ofthe meeting he claimed:
If you think that I have an idea that this is to be a mere sham and that we have
called you together to keep the women quiet, you make a very great mistake.
That is the last thing we have in view. The times are much too serious for games
in
like that. This is really an earnest attempt to face the problem of women
industrial life and in munitions life during the war.

16
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Churchill was not a member of the War Cabinet and was therefore not asked
about his views regarding war strategy. He did, however, manage to streamline the
administrative structure of his office while at the helm. In place offifty semi
autonomous departments Churchill created a Munitions Council made ofeleven
21

members, who would be in charge of several related aspects of munitions production.
As he had done in previous posts, Churchill overhauled what he saw as an inefficient
department and organized it as he deemed fit. This appears to be a continual theme in
Churchill’s management style. His ability to produce enormous

amounts of work was

enabled by his organizational skills. Churchill would not tolerate an inept and ineffective
office and therefore sought to streamline administrative agencies in which he worked
throughout his career, as previously seen when at the Board of Trade and the Admiralty.
At the war’s conclusion a split occurred within the Liberal Party. Those in favor
ofcontinuing a coalition government backed Lloyd George and those wanting a return to
partisan status favored Asquith’s leadership. Churchill had no desire to go back into the
political wilderness and therefore chose to cling to Lloyd George. Patronage from
Asquith was no longer necessary as Churchill had “become a client of Lloyd George,
more so than in the 1908-1912 radical days which they had shared. The question at this
point was what would Lloyd George do with Churchill now that the Liberal Party began
22

to crumble.

Churchill sought to make the Coalition manifesto as radical as possible and

included these ideas in his Dundee campaign. The nationalization ofrailways served as a
major issue for Churchill in which he showed full enthusiasm even if it involved

22

Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life, 'ill.
Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography, 335.
44

government subsidy. In regard to nationalization he stated that, “It might even pay the
State to run the railways at a loss if by developing industries, creating new ones, reviving
agriculture, and placing the trader in closer contact with his markets, they stimulated a
●●23

great development at home.
In an effort to keep as many Liberal concepts as he could in the Government s
policies, Churchill urged Lloyd George to heavily tax the war profits arguing. Why
should anybody make a great fortune out ofthe war’ ?^"^ He also argued for the control of
monopolies “in the general interest” and for taxation levied “in proportion to the ability to
pay.

,25

Lloyd George believed that his and Churchill’s programs in the Liberal Party

ince 1908 could regain the working-class voter from Labour. They would seek social
26

and economic equality by using Liberalism for the voice ofthe underprivileged.
Churchill sought to build upon the wartime cooperation of the British people by
advocating unity in times of peace as they had in war. He asked,“‘Why should peace
have nothing but the squabbles and the selfishness and the pettiness of daily life? Why,if
men and women, all classes, all parties, are able to work together for five years like a
mighty machine to produce destruction^ can they not work together for another five to
produce abundance'"

This idealistic approach to politics is a constant theme for

Churchill in which he advocated a coalition government capable oftranscending petty
party politics. Clearly by this point in his career he had shown both liberal and
conservative tendencies. It is conceivable that Churchill himself knew he could be a
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more effective politician if he was allowed to voice his own opinion free of party
an advantage if a
restraint. His dynamic personality would undoubtedly serve as
moderate coalition style government would follow.
His reelection campaign also included the language of anti-Bolshevism, which
. This sentiment was a product ofthe
had begun to occupy his mind more and more
events taking place in Russia as well as ofthe evidence that socialism and the Labour
movement were gaining ground in Britain at the time. In a speech to his constituents in
Dundee in November of 1918 he warned that,“Civilisation is being complet y
extinguished over gigantic areas,while Bolsheviks hop and caper like troops offerocious
baboons amid the ruins of cities and the corpses oftheir victims

Churchill viewed the

Bolshevik Revolution as infectious in Britain itself and therefore he sought to pre
brand of socialism from festering within British society. Paul Addison believes
greatest fear was Bolshevism conquering Russia and Germany thus allowing it
29

across Europe and Asia.

P

His involvement with the intelligence service made him aware

ofthe presence of Soviet agents in Britain and their funding to groups such as th
Communist Party and other Labour groups who had opposed the war.

Churchill s p

dealing with disgruntled workers and strikes coupled with his growing suspicion of
socialism would become a major theme in his political life. It appears that these concerns
would serve as the boundary for his level ofcommitment to social reform in the future.
Paul Addison points out that beginning in 1919 Churchill distinguished himself as a
reactionary instead of a former radical. He contends that Churchill took up negative
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anti-socialism” towards Russia and the Labour party and abandoned the rhetoric of social
progress Addison argues that the polarization of British politics affected this move
where “as a Coalition Liberal, dependent on the patronage of Lloyd George and the
goodwill of the Conservative Party, Churchill was politically insecure. In callmg for the
creation of a permanent anti-socialist bloc, he was trying to resolve the problem of his
own political identity.”^' I would argue that his fear ofsocialism undoubtedly blunted his
prior inclination to push forward progressive legislation. The change in the British
political landscape brought about uncertainty and forced Churchill to question the degree
to which social progress could be taken and where socialism could harm the stability of
the society in place.
The election of 1918 was a triumph for Lloyd George’s Coalition with 133
Liberal seats won and 335 Coalition Conservatives compared to only 28 seats won by the
Asquith Liberals. Churchill won with a majority labeled “immense” by the Dundee paper
but by fewer votes than he had hoped,

Churchill wanted to return to the Admiralty

under the new Coalition Government; however, Lloyd George wanted him to head the
demobilization task by installing him as Secretary for War and Air in January of 1919.
He inherited the job with a crisis already underway. Military morale was very low at the
time while major strikes threatened both the coal industry and the railroads. Churchill
took action by creating an alternate plan to that of the current failing government plan.
All men who had enlisted before 1916 or were over 40 years of age were to be released
from service. Continuing on,three out offour soldiers were to be sent home with the

Paul Addison,‘Churchill and Social Reform’ in Robert Blake and W.R. Louis (eds.),
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Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life, 404.
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remaining fourth soldier receiving a pay increase. To provide for the Armies of
Occupation, peacetime conscription was enacted on a temporary basis. Paul Addison
notes that this plan reflected the work of a politician who saw the need to consolidate
troop numbers. He also took precautions if discontented soldiers clashed with
34

discontented workers, by organizing the use ofthe military in the case a national strike.
At this time the major concern of the government was social stability. Churchill agreed
with Lloyd George that trade unions were organizations which the government could
negotiate with and that could help moderate the industrial masses. At the same time
Churchill believed that the current state oftrade unionism could be as damaging as it was
helpful. He remarked in a February 4, 1919 War Cabinet meeting that:
Trade union organization was very imperfect, and the more moderate its officials
were,the less representative it was; but it was the only organization with which
the government could deal. The curse oftrade unionism was that there was not
enough of it, and it was not highly developed enough to make its branch
secretaries fall into line with the head office. With a powerful trade umon, peace
35
or war could be made.

The war debt incurred by Britain was also a subject in which Churchill found
himself involved while at the War Department. The National Debt had risen from 706.2
36

million pounds in 1913-1914 to 7,481.1 million in 1919-1920.

Churchill supported the

idea of taxing war wealth. Instead of a proposed capital levy which taxed personal
wealth, the Liberal plan would tax personal wealth that had increased between 1914 and
1918. This thereby would tax an unpopular group that had profited while many Britons
suffered during the war. Churchill wrote to Lloyd George on August 4, 1919 stating:
34
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I do not see how we can look the working classes in the face while these
enormous war fortunes remain untouched ... I don’t wonder ^ere is an ugly spmt
abroad when everyone can see a whole new class of millionaires who made their
fortunes while 5/6ths of the industries ofthe country were in suspension or
abeyance & every little shopkeeper who [could] march was serving in the
trenches. This sense of injustice rankles in every heart and is in my opimon at the
37
root of our troubles.

On June 4, 1920 the majority of ministers followed Bonar Law’s lead in rejecting the
C46

duty proposed. Mary Short, a clerk within the government, wrote,

in the end it was

only Churchill who stayed with the duty and he saw the rejection of it as a fatal blow to
the democratic credentials of the government: his dissent was recorded in the Cabinet
minutes.’” He saw both the financial and political advantages this duty would bring and
found it a shame that money was left to the war profiteers that could have easily been
38

transferred to the State.

In terms of war wealth, Churchill was on the same page as the

Labour Party. This and other issues concerning class politics began to jeopardize
Churchill’s seat in Dundee during this time. The Labour movement began to gain
momentum and the Liberal Party began its decline. While Churchill sought to resolve his
political identity problem, the country began to undergo a change in its own political
identity. Churchill would find himself victim to the changing political circumstances of
post-war Britain.
In 1922 Churchill found himself in the difficult position of recovering from
appendicitis surgery during an election cycle. Remarking after his electoral defeat he
wrote,“I found myself without an office, without a seat, without a party, and without an
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appendix,

in

For the first time in 22 years he found himself out ofParliament finishing i

fourth place in the Dundee election. T.E. Lawrence wrote to Churchill,“What bloody
,.40

shits the Dundeans must be.

Churchill did not take such a bitter stance on the outcome

as he told former Cabinet colleague Herbert Fisher,“If you saw the kind of lives the
«41

Dundee folk have to live, you would admit they have many excuses,

He had been a

leading Liberal Parliamentarian for the previous seventeen years. The Conservatives
were now in office for the first time since 1905 with 354 seats and Labour second with
142. The Liberal dominance in Britain had ended and Churchill had to find his place in
42

the changing spectrum of British politics.
Churchill following the defeat ofthe Liberals retreated to the south of France
where he focused on writing The World Crisis, his history ofthe Great War. The World
Crisis would eventually have five volumes published over a ten-year span filling 2,150
pages. The first volume came out in April of 1923 and the New Statesman commented,
“He has written a book which is remarkably egotistical, but which is honest and which
«43

will certainly long survive him.

The publication of The World Crisis in 1923

coincided with his return to politics as he saw the more accommodating Stanley Baldwin
succeed Bonar Law as Prime Minister and leader ofthe Conservative Party.

This

appeared to be an opportune time for Churchill to make amends with the Conservatives.
Unfortunately for him, Baldwin and the Conservatives campaigned on protectionism
when calling for a general election in December of 1923. At this point Churchill would
39
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still not abandon his subscription to free trade. When asked by a friend where he stood
politically as Baldwin took office, Churchill responded stating,“I am what I have always
been - a Tory Democrat. Force of circumstance has compelled me to serve with another
party, but my views have never changed, and I should be glad to give effect to them by
returning to the Conservatives

Addison believes Churchill recognized that he had to

play a waiting game before being welcomed into the Conservative Party. At the same
time he continued to wait and see how the party position of Tariff Reform would evolve.
Had the Conservatives won the General Election in 1923 and introduced protection, he
believes Churchill would have continued with the Liberals and rekindled his relationship
46

with Lloyd George.

Churchill once again found himselfin party limbo; yet by having a

finger on the political pulse, he could choose his destiny and align with the most
beneficial side for himself.
Churchill stood for the last time as a Liberal for the seat in Leicester West and
was defeated by the Labour candidate. The Liberal Party decided to support a minority
Labour government thereby making Churchill a leader of the right-wing Liberals who
were opposed to socialism. Churchill issued a statement to The Times on January 18,
1924 declaring,‘“The enthronement in office of a Socialist Government will be a serious
national misfortune such as usually has befallen great states only on the morrow of defeat
,„47

in war.

By January 21, 1924, the Baldwin government was defeated by Labour and

Liberal votes making Ramsey McDonald the first Labour Prime Minister. Following the
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election, Winston Churchill sent a private letter of congratulations to the Right
48

Honourable Ramsey McDonald.
Baldwin’s loss of the General Election on a protectionist platform allowed
Churchill to play up both his anti-socialism and his social reform while attempting to
distance himself from the past wartime criticism he received at the Admiralty courtesy of
the Dardanelles debacle. In March of 1924 he ran as an “Independent Anti-Socialisf’ m
Abbey where he told voters:
Although my war record is frequently referred to, I have a large number of
measures of social reform to my credit. These seem to have been forgotten, y
interest in social reform is very real, and it is only because I feel that I will be able
to assist in remedial legislation dealing with housing, and the extension ot
National Insurance, so as to give real49
security against the common hazar so i e,
that I am willing to stand before you.
In the Abbey election Churchill lost a narrow race finding it difficult to run against
Conservative candidates. Two months later on May 7, 1924 Churchill addressed more
than 5,000 Conservatives in Liverpool. Speaking to his first Conservative group in
twenty years he explained there was no longer a place for an independent Liberal party in
British politics. He continued stating that the Conservative Party provided a large enough
base “for the successful defeat of Socialism” and explained that Liberals like himself
»50

must join forces with Conservatives on a “broad political platform.

After this speech

Churchill was offered four invitations from Conservative associations to be their
candidate. At first he was reluctant to rejoin the Conservative Party hoping to retain the
Liberal association he had formed over the previous decades. By mid-June he sought to
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form a party of^orthodox" Liberals, as Martin Gilbert explains, named “LiberalConservatives” which would be independent ofthe Liberal and Conservative Parties.
This plan failed to materialize; yet by July Churchill was able to reach an agreement with
Baldwin whereby he would stand in the next election as a

Constitutionalist” candidate

and have official Conservative support. He also secured Baldwin s promise to find a seat
for him in or near London that would enable him to speak freely throughout Britain
against MacDonald’s economic loan to Soviet Russia and the ideas of Socialism.
In September Churchill accepted the nomination for the seat in Epping, a safe
Conservative seat northeast of London. Two weeks after his acceptance he spoke to a
group of Conservatives in Edinburgh where he stated that there was, no gulf of
principle’ between Conservatives and Liberals.” He declared that Labour s desire for an
Anglo-Soviet Treaty must be resisted prompting a new surge in his popularity within
52

The

Conservative circles where they saw him as once again in line with their views.
Times quoted the Constitutionalist” Epping candidate on October 13,1924, where he
explained his position as similai* to a Liberal Unionist of 1886 stating:
... is the only
I am entirely opposed to minority rule ... the will ofthe majority
healthy foundation of the State ... ‘Trust the people!’ These words of Lor
Randolph Churchill ... embody and express the fundamental principles of British
national life and govemment.”^^
The General Election on October 29,1924 saw a complete victory ofthe Conservatives
with 419 seats won to 151 for Labour and only 40 for the Liberal Party in which
Churchill had been a leading figure only ten months prior. After the win Churchill wrote
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to a friend on November 4*^ and claimed,

think it very likely that I shall be invited to

join the Government as owing to the size ofits majority it will probably be composed
only of impeccable Conservatives,

Many posts were in fact discussed for Churchill

such as the Board of Trade, War Office, Admiralty, and the Ministry of Health. His wife
Clementine urged Churchill to take the Ministry of Health after being summoned to meet
»55

Baldwin as she saw there was much to be done “in housing and other social services.
It was in fact the Treasury which Baldwin offered Churchill. He would later recount that
when asked,“1 should have like to have answered,‘Will the bloody duck swim? [B]ut as
it was formal and important conversation I replied,‘This fulfils my ambition. I still have
my father’s robe as Chancellor. I shall be proud to serve you in the splendid office.
Churchill by 1924 had successfully made his second party switch thus returmng to
the Conservative fold that he had left in 1904. His political consistency and party loyalty
had long been in question since his crossing the floor and joining rank with the Liberal
Party. Churchill addresses this aspect in his book,Amid These Storms; Thoughts and
Adventures, where he argued:
A change of Party is usually considered a much more serious breach of
consistency than a change of view. In fact as long as a man works with a Party e
will rarely find himself accused of inconsistency, no matter how widely his
opinions at one time on any subject can be shown to have altered. Yet Parties are
subject to changes and inconsistencies not less glaring than those ofindividuals.
How should it be otherwise in the fierce swirl ofParliamentary conflict and
Electoral fortune? Change with a Party, however inconsistent, is at least defended
by the power of numbers. To remain constant when a Party changes is to excite
invidious challenge. Moreover, a separation from Party affects all manner of
personal relations and sunders old comradeship. Still, a sincere conviction, in
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harmony with the needs of the time and upon a great issue, will be found to
,57
override all other factors; and it is right and in the public interest that it should.’
Churchill had justified to himself his place in the political spectrum arguing that he had
remained consistent in his political beliefs and that the political climate of Britain was in
fact what had changed. In this respect he had adapted to the times and was comfortable
with what he saw as a continuation of his “Tory Democracy’under the banner of a
different party. The 46-month period of Lloyd George’s peacetime Coalition and the
time spent out of office were what Roy Jenkins refers to as “the least creditable of
Churchill’s career.”"'^ In comparison to other periods of his life this chapter was indeed
the most uneventful, in respect to domestic politics, of an otherwise continually notable
life. He now sat poised to once again make an impact on British politics and more fully
define his position in terms of social progress.
Churchill’s ascension to the Treasury allowed him to separate his ties from Lloyd
George and the Liberal Party’s failures as well as escape his so-called blunders during the
Great War. The position of Chancellor ofthe Exchequer was seen as a stepping-stone to
the Premiership, as the Chancellor in fact lived next door to the Prime Minister in No. 11
Downing Street. The Treasury was the epitome of orthodox British government where
Churchill could work on fiscal issues that affected all aspects of society.^^ In orthodox
fashion he favored a balanced budget yet, similar to his father, saw the Treasury as a
,60

“platform for popular politics.

P.J. Grigg, Churchill’s Private Secretary, stated

Churchill wanted to turn the Treasury into “an active instrument of Government social
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policy instead of a passive concomitant or even, as it sometimes was, an active
.61

opponent.

The Chancellorship was the most powerfiil department in Whitehall in that

every aspect of government relied upon the budget which Churchill was responsible to
produce. His position encompassed such important matters as the handling ofthe war
debt, labour movement issues, taxation schemes, and the expansion of social programs.
Churchill immediately began working on his 1925 Budget within weeks oftaking
office. Unlike many Chancellors, who simply balanced the books, Churchill
62

implemented political strategy,

One of Churchill’s first moves at the Treasury was to

devise and finance a substantial extension of national insurance,the social reform which
he had fifteen years prior been instrumental in enacting. On November 28,1924
Churchill told the Deputy Secretary ofthe Cabinet, Thomas Jones: “I was all for the
Liberal measures of social reform in the old days, and I want to push the same sort of
measures now. Of course 1 shall have to give some reliefto the tax-payers to balance
„63

these measures of reform.

He sought to maintain his old position of social reform
As

while also taking a realist approach by recognizing the political climate ofthe day.
political pragmatist, Churchill had risen back to the upper ranks ofthe government and he
intended to hold onto the reins of power by continuing his reform efforts as in the past
and appeasing his Conservative constituents at the same time. Churchill s blatant desire
for power make it easier to brand him as a partially self-serving politician; yet his
subsequent Budget would embody not only accolades for himself but benefits for the
middle and lower classes of Britain as well.
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The 1925 Budget gives insight into the major issues in British politics during this
time. The centerpiece of Churchiirs 1925 Budget was a substantial reduction ofthe
income tax. At this point income tax rested primarily on the shoulders ofthe middle
class and was levied only on fees, salaries, and company profits. Therefore a reduction of
the tax would greatly benefit the British middle class. Churchill also proposed a new
contributory state pension scheme for the benefit ofthe working classes to go along with
the tax reduction. He explained to Baldwin that it would be hard to give tax breaks to the
professional class,
unless from the standpoint of social and political justice a reliefto the direct
taxpayer should be accompanied by a benefit to the mass ofthe public ... The
assumption by the State of the very large capital liabilities involved in the new
insurance for the benefit of the mass of the people might well be taken as an
equipoise in the general scheme of the Budget

Churchill was constrained somewhat in that the Treasury was seen as a controller
of spending instead of a financier for government programs. In order to finance social
reform measures Churchill began campaigns to cut spending which provoked some
controversy. He acknowledged tlie need to spend more for the Air Force and to maintain
a certain level in the Army, yet saw the Admiralty’s plans as grandiose and wasteful as he
65

had previously done when President ofthe Board of Trade in 1908.

When Churchill

found out that the Admiralty wanted increases in expenditures to counter Japan’s navy he
retorted claiming that if the Admiralty got what they wanted there would be “nothing for
the taxpayer and nothing for social reform.” He did not foresee a war with Japan and
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eventually the Admiralty accepted Churchiirs imposed ceiling on expenditure.^^ He
urged colleagues to “concentrate on a few great issues in the social sphere, such as the
solutions of the housing problem and an “all-in” insurance scheme, rather than fritter
»67

away our resources on a variety of services ....
One such cause which Churchill embraced became a major contribution to the
social welfare state. He saw an opportunity to extend social insurance by working with
the Minister of Health, Neville Chamberlain, on what would become the Widows,
Orphans, and Old Age Pensions Bill. Neville Chamberlain recorded in his diary on
November 26, 1924:
Saw Winston Churchill ... about pensions for widows and old age .... I first
gave him the history of the investigations ... and he then expounded to me the
picture which, as he said, he had made for himself of his next budget. He was
anxious to reduce direct taxation in order to relieve industry ... But he would have
to balance the benefits by doing something for the working classes, and for this he
looked to pensions ... it would have to be my bill, but he would have to find the
money, and the question was would I start in with him, would I enter partnership
and work the plan with him.... It seemed plain to me that he regretted that he
was not Minister of Health. He spoke ofthe position,‘you are in the van, you can
raise a monument, you can leave a name in history.’”
The first scheme introduced in 1908 by Asquith had entitled men and women over 70 a
pension of 5 shillings per week. Although a modest amount, this was fimded completely
out of taxation and therefore seen by the Treasury at the time as too expensive. Lloyd
George and Churchill had later come along believing that pensions should be expanded
and built into a forthcoming scheme of health insurance. Lloyd George offered a 1911
widows’ and orphans’ pensions bill but it died due to opposition by nervous insurance
companies. After the war, popular opinion favored expanding social insurance, and a
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civil servant committee in 1924 urged the Labour Chancellor at the time to implement old
age, widows, and orphan pensions. The Labour Government would fall before the
recommendations could be implemented; but Stanley Baldwin’s Conservative shadow
government, with the help of Neville Chamberlain, was already investigating the idea of
creating a single insurance scheme which included pensions, health, and imemployment
69

insurance.

Churchill found Chamberlain’s bill to be a perfect bridge from his old

reform efforts and also a way to counter his reduction ofthe income tax by helping the
working class.
In preparation for his Budget, Churchill interrogated officials looking for possible
flaws in the proposition of an expanded social insurance program and assessed possible
opposition. On March 4^*^ prior to announcing his Budget, Lord Weir headed an
employers’ delegation to lobby Churchill and warn him against the extension of social
insurance. Their argument held that industry could not stand the burden of growing
social expenditure, which was higher in Britain than many other industrialized coimtries
at the time. Churchill responded to this claim stating:
Personally, I feel that the system of insurance, whatever may be the effects on the
in
self-reliance of the individual, is going to be an absolutely inseparable element
our social life and eventually must have the effect of attaching the minds of the
people, although their language and mood in many cases may not seem to indicate
it- it must lead to the stability and order ofthe general structure.”

It is clear that Churchill recognized that the government had both the ability and
the responsibility to provide for its citizens. It can also be construed that Churchill saw
action in this matter as a political necessity. When political necessities exist it is difficult
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for one not to attempt to capitalize on the political benefits. As in previous tunes,
Churchill had seen his crossing the floor both times as political necessities. He had seen
unemployment insurance and the devolution ofthe House of Lords power as political
necessities. Whether his actions at this point were genuinely humanitarian or politically
motivated, one can only reach a speculative answer. It is my contention that Churchill
convinced himself that the welfare ofthe people must be addressed and that he had the
answers to solve these social problems. The extraordinary ability of politicians to
convince themselves of their correctness on an issue must not be forgotten. In
Churchill’s case it cannot be understated that this tendency proved true to a much greater
degree than his contemporaries. Churchill’s proclivity to see himself as an authority in
all areas of politics does not in itself void him of genuineness in this respect. It is
undeniable that Churchill played a crucial role in not only arguing for social insurance
but also working to enact measures to widen the social welfare state. It is with this action
that one must note a level of concern and dedication to the issue of social reform.
Another issue over which Churchill toiled in preparation for his 1925 Budget was
the idea of returning to the gold standard. His advisors at the Treasury attempted to
convince him that returning to the pre-war gold standard would reduce unemployment.
Churchill, as he often did, gathered proponents of both sides where Otto Niemeyer
(Controller of Finance) and Sir John Bradbury argued against Reginald McKenna and
John Maynard Keynes at a dinner party Churchill hosted. The McKenna/Keynes
argument claimed that deflation and unemployment would follow if there were a return to
the gold standard. When asked by Churchill what choice he would make as a politician
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McKenna replied, “There is no escape. You will have to go back; but it will be hell.
Churchill was uneasy in the Treasury Department’s recommendation. He told his
officials on January 29, 1925 that, “to go back to Gold favoured the special interests of
finance at the expense of the interests of production.” Again on February 22 he told them
„72

“ I would rather see Finance less proud and Industry more content,

Keynes would

later retort (highlighting the same previously mentioned concerns of Churchill) in his
pamphlet entitled The Economic Consequences ofMr. Churchill where he argued that the
return to the pre-war standards would involve “overvaluation of sterling where export
industries would attempt to reduce production costs by cutting workers wages. Keynes
choice of a title is somewhat misleading as his argument blamed Churchill s advisors
73

more than the man himself

In his Budget speech Churchill announced the return to the

pre-war gold standard at $4.86 to the pound. This move made the Conservative Party, the
Treasury, and the Bank of England very happy and calmed those of Tory leaning who
74

showed distrust in Churchill.

Labour also supported the return to the gold standard at

this time, and criticized Churchill when the pound faced devaluation. Churchill would
later recognize the return as a mistake but blamed the Governor of the Bank of England,
75

Montagu Norman for this.

The return to the gold standard served as only one aspect to this famous freshman
Budget that Churchill announced before the House of Commons on April 28, 1925. His
Budget centered on the introduction ofthe new reform measures and changes in the
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income tax in the interests of tlie middle and working classes. He stated in his speech
that when misfortune had descended upon a workman’s home:
It leaves this once happy family in the grip ofthe greatest calamity. Although the
threat of adversity has been active all these years, no effective provision has been
made by the great mass of the labouring class for their widows and families in the
event of death. 1 am not reproaching them, but it is the greatest need at the
present time. If I may change to a military metaphor, it is not the sturdy marching
troops that need extra reward and indulgence. It is the stragglers, the weak,the
wounded, the veterans, the widows and orphans to whom the ambulances of State
76
aid should be directed.
He continued his speech announcing that Chamberlain would soon introduce an old age
widows’ and pensions bill. Under this plan widows and orphans would receive pensions
at the point of bereavement making 200,000 women and 350,000 children immediate
beneficiaries. Other benefits would begin at age 65 and the “restrictions, inquisitions and
77

means tests” would be eliminated altogether,

In his speech Churchill took some credit

for the pensions reform referencing his newfound Toryism while also alluding to his
continuity in the arena of social reform. He stated that,“The old laissez-faire or laissezaller ideas of mid-Victorian radicalism have been superseded, and no one has done more
to supersede them than the right. Hon. Member for Caernarvon Boroughs [Lloyd
George]. I am proud to have been associated with him from the very beginning ofthose
large insurance ideas.”^^ The issue of his political consistency was tacitly addressed by
Churchill and once again he alluded to his constancy in the area ofreform and his ability
to conduct bipartisan politics.
Neville Chamberlain wrote in his diary following Churchill’s Budget speech on May 1,
1925:
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"Winston’s exposition of the Budget was a masterly performance, and though my
office and some of my colleagues are indignant at his taking to himselfthe credit
for a scheme which belongs to the Ministry of Health, I did not myselfthink that I
had any reason to complain of what he said. In a sense it is his scheme. We were
pledged to something of the kind, but I don’t think we should have done it this
year if he had not made it part of his Budget scheme, and injny opinion he does
deserve special personal credit for his initiative and drive.
Chamberlain and Churchill’s scheme did not guarantee against poverty but
nevertheless helped. It cost the government £4 Million a year but paled in comparison to
war pensions, which cost £67.3 Million per year. It served as the first contributory
scheme of state pensions and covered roughly 15 million people freeing thousands from
80

depending upon the poor law.

It is Martin Gilbert’s contention that social reform was

the ‘great cause’ in which Churchill was immersed at the time. He claims that,
‘‘[Churchill’s] concern was the hardship that fell upon a family after the prolonged
5s81

unemployment, old age, sickness or death ofthe breadwinner.

Paul Addison believes

Churchill’s involvement "underlined his commitment to the idea ofthe state as the
provider of a safety net.” He also believes that Churchill recogmzed the long-term
effects this project would have upon the Exchequer and the forthcoming apprehensions of
industrialists. Therefore it is his contention that ‘‘perhaps ... the act was a lesson for
Churchill in the limits of social insurance: a terminus beyond which no further extension
was feasible.

,82

This particular experiment is in fact the last major social project in

which Churchill engaged on his own initiative. From this point on legislation in response
to pressure rather than self-motivated actions are mostly taken by Churchill in regards to
social reform. It is unfair to wholeheartedly conclude that he had reached his personal
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limits concerning social legislation. At the same time it must be noted that his work in
the domestic reform arena after his term as Chancellor ofthe Exchequer became much
more reactionary in comparison to his earlier career.
In addition to the announcement of Chamberlain’s bill, Churchill also addressed
changes in the national income tax that reflected his interest in the plight ofthe middle
and working classes. Churchill cut the income tax just as other Chancellors since
Gladstone had aimed to do. What made his budget different was shifting the direct tax
83

burden from active to passive wealth by increasing death duties.

Churchill announced a

10 per cent reduction of income tax on the lowest income groups hoping that in Martin
Gilbert’s terms, “that by liberating the production of new wealth from some ofthe
shackles of taxation the Budget might stimulate enterprise and accelerate industrial
revival.„84 Although known for his extravagant spending habits and constant need of
income, as Chancellor of the Exchequer Churchill exercised control over public monetary
matters. The post-war period allowed him to trim military spending while giving benefits
to the middle and lower class through Chamberlain’s pensions bill and a reduction in the
income tax in this 1925 Budget.
In his subsequent years at the Treasury, Churchill faced several obstacles due to
the changes in the political and industrial climate. In regard to the concept of Free Trade
he accepted only minor moves such as imperial preference and the safeguarding of
industries against competition abroad. One of his first actions as Chancellor was in fact a
new Safeguarding Bill” which Liberals used to accuse him of abandoning Free Trade.
His astute political mind quickly went to work picking them off one by one in showing
83
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they had each supported similar measures in the past,

Churchill shot down tariff

reformers who pushed for protective duties in the iron and steel industries giving no
86

concessions to those who pushed for concepts which he viewed as socialistic,

Churchill

was initially seen as a good person to pick up for the Conservatives as a free trader in
87

hopes that some Liberal ^^oters would join their camp,

However, his decision to return

to the Gold Standard as well as the events of the General Strike in 1926 would hurt his
reputation in both Liberal and Labour circles.
In late April of 1926 a temporary wage subsidy to prevent a possible miners’
strike ended with no resolution to the issue. A general strike was threatened by the
General Council of the TUC in support of the miners which prompted the Baldwin
Government and Churchill to recognize a strike must be prevented. Judging by
Churchill’s prior strike credentials, Baldwin chose to put him in an

ill-defined” role with

an editorial capacity at the British Gazette^ which served as an emergency government
88

newspaper to battle the strikers.

In this role Churchill was prevented from engaging in

incidents to the degree of Tonypandy or Llanelli and he was unable to avoid the public
image of the “class warrior which he had gained in his earlier years. Labour greatly
emphasized Churchill’s happiness during the strike. A character in H.G. Well s novel
Meanwhile (1927) describes the General Strike to a friend stating,“As might be expected
Winston has gone clean off his head. He hasn’t been so happy since he crawled on his
belly and helped snipe in Sidney Street, Whatever anyone else may think, Winston
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believes that he is fighting a tremendous revolution and holding it down,fist and jaw. He
,89

careers around staring, inactive, gaping, crowded London,looking for bamcades.
Whether his words and actions merited this view, allusions to Churchill’s past encounters
such as the misconstrued Sidney Street affair, where he only observed a robbery and
police standoff, testify to the continual accusations that he was in fact trigger-happy and
looking for an incident. Churchill saw the General Strike as challenging the Constitution
yet viewed the problems within the coal industry as purely industrial. The Canadian
Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, put the blame completely on Churchill noting in his
diary:
“Baldwin did splendidly till the last moment, he has been influenced by Winston
Churchill against his better judgment... Churchill may be shot, anything may
happen & a revolution greater than anything England has ever known brought on
... I feel sorry for Baldwin, for the King,& many others — for Churchill I feel a
scorn too great for words. He has been the evil genius in this.”

Churchill seemed to be an easy scapegoat to blame considering his past relations with
social unrest and his disdain for the strike as a bargaining tool. Yet, regardless ofthese
negative accusations, Churchill himself worked to bring about a compromise and the
miners back to work following the end of the General Strike. Although the General
Strike ended after nine days, the problems within the coal industry continued without
91

much help from the Baldwin Government.

Tom Jones, the Assistant Secretary of the

Cabinet, comments in his diary that Churchill was at work on securing an agreement in
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September only to be “thwarted by the minowners in the end.

Churchill would later

support the Trade Union Act of 1927 which made general strikes illegal as well as
prohibited civil ser\^ants from joining trade unions that were associated with the Labour
93

Churchill was in fact anti-

Party and reduced political funds available to trade umons.

union in that he had disdain for the use of the strike as a weapon. However,the ability of
unions to create a dialogue between workers and the government that could yield results
and rectify disputes was an aspect in which Churchill fully believed. This sentiment
which Churchill held fit within the philosophy of“Tory Democracy” which assumed that
the Tory in power would always show benevolence toward the working class. This belief
also naively assumed tliat a union without the weapon ofthe strike could still maintain
bargaining power with the government ofthe employer. In 1928 the Kent local secretary
of the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers in fact invited Churchill to
become a member due to his hobby of brick laying. Churchill replied in writing stating,
“I should be very pleased to join the union if you are ofthe opinion that it would not be
unwelcome to your members.” After paying his dues and being formally admitted at the
94

Treasury the union’s Executive Council ruled him ineligible.
During his time as Chancellor ofthe Exchequer Churchill also offered reform
ideas with respect to the way economic matters were to be handled by the British
government. The Great Economic Slump of 1929-1932 followed the Black Tuesday
Wall Street Crash. Britain, as did the United States, faced major economic problems and
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unemployment as a result. It was offered by the Left that the poor economic times
95

proved capitalism had failed and the system needed major reform,

The slump in Britain

had revived the protectionist cause in the Conservative Party prompting Lord
Beaverbrook to begin a campaign for “Empire Free Trade” in 1930. This move began to
shake the Conservative leadership making Neville Chamberlain look to be the most likely
successor to Baldwin. These political events prompted Churchill to begin what Paul
96

Addison calls a “dignified retreat” from Free Trade,

OnJunel9,1930, Churchill

delivered a lecture at Oxford University entitled “Parliamentary Government and the
Economic Problem.” In his speech he pointed out that since the war many ofthe issues
facing Parliament were not political but economic. It was his contention that a system of
»97

government “seems to lose much of its authority when based upon universal suffrage.
He continued by arguing:
Everyone knows what people wish. They wish for more prosperity. How to get
it? That is the grim question, and neither the electors nor their representatives are
competent to answer it. Governments and the various parties moving in the
political sphere are not free to proclaim the proper remedies in their completeness,
even if they knew them. All kinds of popular cries can be presented for an
election, and each may contain some measure of truth. None in itself will provide
us with the key. For this reason opinion has been turning towards the treatment of
the subject on national and non-party lines.^^
Consequently he would recommend the creation of a subordinate “Economic Parliament
made up of people with technical and business qualifications.^^ Churchill did not believe
a single political party would adopt necessary, but unpopular, economic policies for fear
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of their electoral consequences.

This proposition testifies to the pragmatical side of

Churchill and his self-image as one who stood above party politics.
As the decade of the 1930’s began and Labour once again took control ofthe
government, issues such as the economy and international relations began to occupy
ChurchilTs mind more so than the topic of social reform. Churchiirs career would enter
a new stage where he would play a minor role in domestic politics until the realities of a
second World War created new demands on British society.
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Chapter III
The Later Years'

Despite occasional interventions, Winston Churchill postponed the subject of
social reform after resigning from the Shadow Cabinet in 1931. Following the
Conservative defeat in 1929 he played the role of opposition spokesman on economic
issues but by 1931 had shifted his focus to India where he led Tories in opposition to
Baldwin’s imperial policies.* From 1931 to 1939 Churchill found himselfin his so-called
Wilderness Years.

During this time India, foreign policy, rearmament, and writing

would occupy most of his attention. Both his country and his political colleagues saw
him at this time as being somewhat antiquated. Paul Addison notes that Churchill s
aforementioned Romanes Lecture at Oxford in 1930 was “more than a farewell to free
trade.^ It was a farewell to the social and economic questions he had tackled with such
confidence in the Edwardian era, and with much bafflement as Chancellor of the
Exchequer.” The defense of British rule in India became Churchill’s new cause to gain
political power where, it appears, his ambitions overrode his convictions.
The issue of India hardly pertains to the topic at hand nor does the topic of his
growing push for rearmament to meet Germany. Excluding his international concerns.

* Paul Addison,‘Churchill and Social Reform’ in Robert Blake and W.R. Louis (eds.),
ChurchilU 70.
^ See page 63.
^ Paul Addison, Winston Churchill: The Unexpected Hero, 132.
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Churchill’s primary focus in politics would continue to be economic matters. There are
rare instances during this time when Churchill rose to speak in Parliament about social
concerns. One such outburst came in March of 1936 where Churchill shocked the House
of Commons by attacking the Household Means Test on the unemployed. He stated:
When we were introducing the legislation in regard to Old Age Pensions the
whole trend of it ... was to consolidate the home, and give the old man and the
old woman who sit by the ingle nook something to pay their way in the cottage
home, something to give them the right to sit there and make it possible for their
dependants and children to support them. It was a matter of weaving together the
ties of the family. Now this household means test, which is so much considered
at the present time and which has much to be said for it plausibly at first sight, is
found to work a splitting function in regard to this home life, and to invite people
in the same family, under the same roof, to ask,‘What are you doing, what are ^
you bringing in?’ and to assess in a meticulous and invidious fashion each other s
relative contribution to the maintenance of the family circle.
It appears that beyond such outbursts, Churchill during this period of his political life
viewed social reform as a matter of past accomplishments in which he had played a
crucial role instead of a current pressing concern. The causes of social reform that had
occupied his early Parliamentary career and had resurfaced during his tenure at the
Treasury seemed to dissipate in his mind during this period. His preoccupation with
India and the growing threat of fascist Gemiany caused many to be skeptical of his
direction.
Distrust in Churchill continued during these “wilderness years” and colleagues
issued harsh criticism of his character. His friend Lord Beaverbrook would note. He has
been everything in every Party. He has held every view on every question ... he is utterly
unreliable in his mental attitude.^ Churchill continued to battle the issue of party loyalty

Paul Addison,‘Churchill and Social Reform’ in Robert Blake and W.R. Louis (eds.),
Churchill^ 70.
^ Paul Addison, Winston Churchill: The Unexpected Hero^ 135.
71

as he had done throughout his career. Neville Chamberlain would write in 1935 that.
4(4

As for Winston he makes a good many speeches considerably fortified by cocktails and
old brandies. Some of them are very good speeches in the old style, but they no longer
convince. His following tends to shrink rather than to increase.

Not only was

Churchill mistrusted in terms of partisan issues but, he was also viewed by colleagues as
somewhat out of touch with the times as evidenced by his Victorian Period political
mannerisms.
Churchill would devote much of his time to writing instead of politics during the
decade of the 1930’s. His literary career during this time was spurred by both political
and monetary reasons. He did not rewrite history; but purposely chose topics that
involved himself and his family in an attempt to rectify any political harm or criticism of
the past. My Early Life^ published in October, 1930, expoimded upon his childhood,
adventures in the military, and his early life in Parliament.^ His major work during this
decade would be the great biography Marlborough: His Life and Times; the first volume
was published in autumn of 1933 and the fourth and final volume in 1938. He would
also sign a contract for A History ofthe English-Speaking Peoples^ which he began in
August of 1938 with a 1,000 word-a-day target. By September of 1939 he suspended
work on the almost completed project amassing roughly 530,000 words. Churchill would
publish a series of biographical profiles published as Great Contemporaries in 1937
while also contributing weekly commentaries in the Evening Standard, which were
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syndicated throughout Europe. Churchill was probably the highest paid English author of
his day although his earnings hardly matched his lavish spending habits.^
Churchill's political resurrection came with the advent of World War II.
Following Chamberlain's radio announcement that Britain was at war with Germany,
Churchill made his way to the House of Commons. Although being out of office for over
ten years, such w as his stature that Churchill was asked to address the Commons
immediately. Subsequently after the debate he was summoned to Chamberlain s room
10

and offered his former post at the Admiralty, which he had held from 1911 to 1915.

As

the war continued on, there grew pressure for a change ofPrime Minister, most strongly
after the military failure in Norway. Chamberlain recognized a coalition government was
inevitable and Labour had refused to serve under his leadership. Viscount Halifax looked
to be a promising candidate for the post, but he quickly removed himselffrom the picture
knowing he could not operate a war from the House of Lords. Chamberlain s advice to
install Churchill as Prime Minister was seen by many as a dangerous gamble but power
was transferred on May 10 of 1940 with the cooperation ofthe Labour Party. Churchill
of course saw this opportunity in quite a different light remarking,“I felt as though I were
walking with destiny and that ail my past life had been a preparation for this hour and for
this trial.”
The issue of social policy for Winston Churchill during his first tenure as Prime
Minister was, as Paul Addison describes, “less a problem for the future than a record of
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progress accomplished/*’- He offers this as one reason why Churchill would take a more
negative view of the issue of reform while Prime Mimster. One explanation for
Churchill’s apparent departure from radical social reform is that he believed Britain had
achieved an adequate level of social reform. Another explanation of his Premiership s
hands-off approach is that military matters superseded any debate on domestic and long
time partisan issues. After all he served not only as Prime Minister but also as the self
appointed Minister of Defense overseeing all military decisions. The future existence of
Britain was uncertain as Germany waged war, and thus a fine line exists between
Churchill’s lack of concern and his lack of time.
Kevin Jefferys suggests that Churchill’s lukewarm approach to social reform
during World War II was also shared by many in the coalition leadership such as
Beaverbrook and Kingsley Wood. The Conservative leadership therefore left these
matters to younger and more junior members ofthe government such as R.A. Butler, who
would become Minister of Education in 1941. Labour leaders on the contrary held key
positions in regards to social reform. Men such as Bevin, Morrison, and Dalton often
justified their participation in the coalition with the notion that they were securing
Britain’s future economic and social welfare.’^ This being said, the Conservatives still
exercised the most control in the government. While R.A. Butler controlled education
policy. Lord Portal and W.S. Morrison were in charge of housing, Henry Willink at the
Ministry of Health, and Kingsley Wood at the Treasury.’"’
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Churchill would first encounter social policy issues as Prime Minister with
respect to R.A. Butler’s work at the Board of Education. After two months as Minister,
“RAB” recommended to the Prime Minister an increase in technical training, a settlement
with churches concerning church schools and religious instruction, and a discussion of
the role and future for public schools. Churchill would respond in a crushing manner to
RAB stating it would be “the greatest mistake to raise the 1902 controversy dunng the
war, and certainly cannot contemplate a new Education Bill. He would continue to
stress the war’s priority stating:
No one can possibly tell what the financial and economic state ofthe country will
be when the war is over. Your main task at present is to get the schools workmg
as well as possible under all the difficulties of air attack, evacuation, etc. I
can add to this industrial and technical training, enabling men not required for the
Army to take their places promptly in mumtions,industry or radio work,this
would be most useful. We cannot have any party politics in war time, and both
your second and third points raise these in a most acute^^d dangerous form.
Meanwhile you have a good scope as an administrator.

This line of reasoning is representative of Churchill’s domestic strategy as a
wartime leader. Issues that could be delayed and issues that were susceptible to partisan
bickering were topics which he wanted to avoid. It must be noted that Churchill himself
was not clueless as to the issue of education during this time. A government official
recorded in 1942 after speaking with Churchill that he

was glad public schools had their

attention and “wanted 60-70 per cent ofthe places to be filled by bursaries-not by
examination alone but on the recommendation ofthe counties and the great cities.
Churchill did not want to send people to schools due to their “accident of birth and wealth
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but by the accident — for it was equally accident - of ability,

Churchill, when speaking

in 1940 at Harrow School, told pupils that once the war was over the advantages of
Public Schools must be broadened and extended to others.

It appears that Churchill was

not against education legislation but opposed to it simply during the time of war. Clearly
he recognized faults in the current education system and felt that at the appropriate time
action should be taken.
For the first two years of the war, almost all political energy

was directed to the

war effort. Kevin Jefferys believes the appointment ofthe Labour veteran Arthur
Greenwood as the minister responsible for reconstruction suggested the low pnonty of
reform during this time.*^ Greenwood himselffound it difficult to enact any policy
initiatives in this position. Hugh Dalton, the Minister of Economic Warfare and later
President of the Board of Trade, would suggest that Churchill was allergic to post war
policy” in which he succeeded in the most part of avoiding domestic issues
threaten his coalition’s unity.

which could

The first half of the war was absent of social initiatives

and reflected the mood of the Conservative Party. There was lingering resentment o
the removal of Chamberlain in 1940, which prompted some backbenchers to voice
20

disapproval of Churchill’s leadership,

This would coincide later with Labour s growing

tendency to vote against the coalition government in 1942. Some within the Labour
Party began to fear a repetition of“the 1918 trick” where they would be kept in
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government until victory was seen and then pushed back to minority political status,
was at this time that the famous Beveridge Report entered the political forefront.

William Beveridge's publication in 1942 helped to transform the coalition government’s
social policy and forced Churchill and his ministers to pay attention to the concept of
postwar reconstruction. The reaction Churchill had to this report helps to clarify his
position on social reform during this stage in his life and allows some conclusions to be
drawn in regard to his opinion on the subject of reform as a whole.
William Beveridge had been asked to chair a minor government committee on
insurance benefits in 1941 and he used this position to create a blueprint for post war
on
social reform. The report called for a comprehensive system of social security based
rates of subsistence along with a new health service. Jose Hams suggests that this work s
significance is not the originality of its ideas but the “successful synthesis and
transmission of plans to rationalize the disjointed insurance schemes which existed before
the war.”^^ Beveridge’s plan which included family allowances, a National Health
Service, and policies to prevent mass unemployment, was met by much popular acclaim.
Churchill and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Kingsley Wood,feared the proposals
would place too large of a burden on post-war industry. This fear which both Churchill
and Wood shared was not held by the majority of people as the Beveridge Report had
quickly gained populeir support among the masses. Churchill could also not afford to
distance himselffrom Labour leaders who supported Beveridge and could bring problems
on the Coalition. The War Cabinet accepted Churchill’s proposal to halt social
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legislation during wartime, yet preparation for post-war reconstruction commenced
23

during this time especially within the Labour camp.
Beveridge himself had cordial relations with Churchill during the inter war years
yet both had grown intellectually estranged since their earlier Edwardian reform stages.
Jose Harris believes the war had reinforced Churchill’s beliefs in traditional values
whereas it gave Beveridge “an almost extrasensory consciousness of revolutionary
»24

change.

Harris

Churchill at this point saw Beveridge as an “impractical visionary.

contends that what hurt Beveridge in the eyes of the government was the manner in
which he solicited the advance publication of his report. It was

his behavior which

people had a problem with. It appeared to be a usurpation ofthe regular policymaking
machine” and a breach of protocol. He would not play an official role in policy making
for the rest of the war but he had forced the coalition government to address his cause
25

nonetheless.

There is some speculation regarding Churchill s motives for delaying real
execution of the Beveridge Plan. Jose Harris states that Churchill believed the planning
of reconstruction should wait until after the war and a general election to test popular
26

support before he could commit himself,

Clement Attlee stated,“I think the real reason

was that Winston pleinned to come in as the first post-war

Prime Minister and he thought

it would be a nice thing to have the Beveridge Report to put through as an act of his
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Government.

It can therefore be construed that Attlee did not believe Churchill was

opposed to enacting the Beveridge Report. Paul Addison believes this is highly plausible
but acknowledges that Conservative implementation would have been orgamzed
28

differently than the Labour Government’s.

If Churchill did not want to avoid reform in

1943 he wanted to delay reform until after the war. This would prove difficult for him
and he would face electoral repercussions as a result. Slowly concessions were given to
both sides of the isle as he walked a thin line between handling a war and appeasing his
coalition government.
After the debate on the Beveridge Report it was decided to create another official
committee, without Beveridge included, to determine what the government was to do
concerning social refonn. Once Conservatives realized they could not ignore the report
29

they tended to welcome it in principle and then whittle it with criticism.

Although both

Conservative and Labour members now backed social reform in principle, there were few
signs of a consensus on welfare issues. Labour accepted coalition policy as a minimum
installment of reform while Conservatives believed this to be a maximum for a post war
administration.^® Kevin Jefferys states:
The fact that both parties operated within the same political framework made a
certain level of agreement inevitable, and the war had clearly brought social
reform to the forefront of politics in such a way that it could not be ignored by
any post-war government. But the overt hostility ofthe early war years and the
differing interpretations given to coalition policy after 1943 make it difficult to
endorse the idea that Labour and Conservative supporters were coming to have
certain beliefs in common. Apart from the recognition that particular issues
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would have to be tackled, the parties were in many ways as far apart on social
issues as they had been before 1939.
On the 21

of March 1943, Churchill announced that his government would

prepare a “Four-Year Plan" for post-war reconstruction. He recognized that the only way
his party could remain in office was to compromise with the Beveridge Plan. If he could
32

not avoid the report then he would appropriate it.

In a radio speech Churchill stated.

“You must rank me and my colleagues as strong partisans of national compulsory
«33

insurance for all classes for all purposes from the cradle to the grave,

Churchill began

to prepare for an inevitable election in which his party must appear in step with such
popular refomi measures. The government’s white paper during this time would reaffirm
many recommendations made by Beveridge but abandon his crucial emphasis on
providing minimum subsistence income. Adopting a party platform that struck a
resemblance to the Report looked to be in the Conservatives’ favor for a looming
34

election.

Early in 1943 the government accepted the idea ofreforming the nation s health
services as advocated by Ernest Brown and William Beveridge. The Ministry of Health
published a white paper later in February 1944 which committed the government to

a

new and free national health service and served as a precursor to what Labour would pass
35

during their administration after 1945.

The coalition government by spring of 1945 had

prepared draft bills which included not only this plan for national health services but also
31
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comprehensive social insurance and family allowances,

It appears as though Churchill

aimed to enact this type of legislation once elected to a second term. It was in this
context that the general election of 1945 took place.
Henry Felling states,"Not until Germany appeared on the point of collapse in late
\944 did the prospect of peace revive the conflict of party.^ The existing House of
Commons had been elected in 1935 and of course the minority parties were the most
unhappy with the current makeup. Conservatives favored a new election soon hoping to
capitalize on the war while Labour assumed to delay a little longer hoping that the
Conservatives’ popularity would die down after some time had passed. On May 18,1945
Churchill sent a letter to Attlee offering an early dissolution ofParliament or the
continuation of the coalition government until the end ofthe war with Japan. Attlee
responded suggesting an amendment to this letter which would appease the National
Executive Committee of the Labour Party in continuing the coalition. The amendment
was the inclusion of the sentence: “In the meantime [during the continued Coalition] we
would together do our utmost to implement the proposals for social security and full
,,38

employment contained in the White Papers which we have laid before Parliament.
Despite this effort, Attlee would be overruled by his party executive in continuing to
participate in a coalition thus prompting Churchill to call for elections in July. Clearly
Attlee wanted the government’s focus to be on social security and employment, but it
was unclear what Churchill would choose to focus on during the reconstruction process.
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Churchill became Prime Minister of a caretaker government mainly of
Conservatives, National Liberals, and remaining civil servants. He and Attlee both gave
election radio broadcasts where in one Churchill made the famous comment that a
Socialist government “would have to fall back on some form of Gestapo, no doubt very
humanely directed in the first instance,

The socialist scare tactic which Churchill had

employed in the past once again reared its head once peacetime politics resumed. This
sentiment would evoke the events of Tonypandy and Churchill s handling ofthe General
Strike in many Labour-leaning minds. The Tory campaign manifesto was entitled Mr.
Churchill’s declaration of policy to the electors,” hoping to capitalize on his leadership
40

and reputation,

These two different yet equally strong aspects of Churchill’s reputation

testify as to the divided opinions the nation held oftheir wartime leader facing postwar
reconstruction. It was thought that his leadership would make the election outcome
favorable to the Conservative Party but results told a different story. Labour would
capture 393 seats to 213 seats for the Conservatives and their allies, giving Labour an
41

overall majority of 148 that has only been topped by Tony Blair’s Labour Party in 1997.
Several explanations have been offered as to the electoral outcome in 1945. Paul
Addison believes Churchill failed to recognize the importance of housing and
employment policy to the electorate while campaigning. Although the leadership which
he had provided was believed to guarantee a win in his reelection attempt, it is widely
held that his continual management throughout the war had drained him both mentally
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and physically thus pre\ enting him from campaigning to his fullest ability

The Times

remarked that Churchill had used the \wong tactics in the election and was to blame for
“emphasizing the narrow animosities of the party fight.” The Manchester Guardian
believed the mistake was Churchill’s attempt “to turn the election into a personal
..43

plebiscite,

Churchill himself did not subscribe to these points of view. His wartime

memoirs explain that he believed the defeat was due to weakness in the Conservative
organization. Many of the Tories had gone to serve in the war where Labour agents were
in factories and ready for political activity. He states,“They all did work on the home
front which no one else could have done, and at the same time they maintained — and who
«44

could blame them? — their party affiliations.
After 1945 Churchill had nowhere to go but down. Roy Jenkins suggests:
He was always subject to bouts of‘black-dog’ depression, the threat of which
became greater as his life moved to a stage when windows were more likely to
close than open. The best prophylactic for black dog that he knew was red boxes
and the fleet of private secretaries and sense of purpose and power which went
with them.'^^
The period between 1945 and 1951 saw Churchill as Leader ofthe Opposition during
which he largely attacked the Attlee Government’s economic record. From 1945 to 1947
Churchill did not participate in any debates concerning nationalization, social insurance,
or the National Health Service. In fact it was not until the spring of 1946 when the
govermnent lowered food rations below the wartime level that Churchill showed any fire.
He told Moran,“A short time ago I was ready to retire and die gracefully. Now I’m
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going to Slay and have them out ... I’ll tear their bleeding entrails out ofthem [Labour
..46

Government].

In terms of social policy however he would contest the idea that Labour

had been solely responsible for welfare measures and he looked to gain credit for his
coalition government in the formation of the British welfare state. In a Commons debate
in 1949 Churchill declared:
It really is remarkable that the accusation of being callous about unemployment or
the welfare of the people should be launched against me,the author ofthe labour
exchanges and the first Unemployment Insurance Act, and, as Conservative
Chancellor of the Exchequer, of the Old Age Pensions Act being lowered from 70
to 65 and the institution of the Widows and Orphans Act. When the right hon.
and learned Gentleman or anybody on those benches can show services to the
working classes equal to those I have mentioned they will be more free to throw
stones at others. All the benevolent and beneficial aspects ofthis Parliament
were actually planned ... by the National Coalition government of which I was
the head and which rested on an overall Conservative majority in the House
47
of 150.

Although Churchill was no socialist, he was proud of his accomplishments in the arena of
social refonn. He was quick to point out his past efforts yet disciplined enough to
maintain accuracy in his election promises. With growing budget concerns and the
possibility of a Conservative win in the future general election, Churchill warned his
fellow party members at the 1949 Conservative Conference. He stated,“We are not
going to try to get into office by offering bribes and promises ofimmediate material
benefit to our people ... It would be far better for us to lose the election than to win it on
,48

false pretences.’
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By 1951 he \\ ould be restored to office and leading a country which under the
exiting Labour Government had undergone massive change in social structure and the
expansion of the British welfare state. The government that Churchill regained was a
different government from the one he had known during the first half ofthe Twentieth
Century. Churchill once again sat at the helm as a new era of British politics began. Roy
Jenkins states: “It is impossible to re-read the story of Churchill’s life as Prime Minister
of that second go\ emment without feeling that he was gloriously unfit for office. The
»49

Churchill was 76 at

oxymoron is appropriate to the contradictions in his performance,

the time he fonned his cabinet making him the oldest Prime Minister since William
50

Gladstone.

Prominent Conseiv'atives such as Anthony Eden, R.A. Butler, and Harold

Macmillan all joined Churchill’s cabinet where Macmillan noted,“It was fun to join
«51

again in the old scenes which reminded me ofthe wartime Churchill,

Churchill even

attempted to recreate a coalition style government by offering the Liberal Party leader
Clement Davies the post of Minister of Education. Henry Pelling believes that Davies
52

would have accepted this post had his own party let him.

Churchill chose a government

that according to Ralph Raico was probably the least recognizably Conservative in
53

history.

Under his second premiership, Churchill would not attempt to undo the welfare

state enacted by Labour. He actually addressed deficiencies in areas such as housing and
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public works which were leftover from the Labour government while directing his
54

“leftist” Labour Minister, Walter Monckton,to appease unions at all costs.
Earlier in 1950 Churchill had remarked to R.A. Butler that: “There will, in the
future, be much less politics in social reform though much perhaps in economic
breakdown.

Churchill's administration focused more on economic concerns during

this time where there was debate about whether or not to float the pound in respect to the
economic crisis.

Roy Jenkins asserts that the currency issue was a constant situation

where the incoming government exaggerated the poor budgetary legacy left by the former
57

government.

Despite this debate it was the desire ofthe Conservative Party to

dismantle the economic controls implemented by the Labour government while retaining
the welfare state in place. Kenneth Morgan states that, “[Winston Churchill] was above
all anxious to demonstrate his capacity for ordered, peaceful statesmanship, canymgthe
working class with him in patriotic endeavor,and to refute early accusations that he was
an unreconciled class warrior.

This notion thus cued the more moderate government

he would install.
As Prime Minister, Churchill would only reverse the nationalization ofiron, steel
and road haulage with the first two being hardly implemented and the third highly
unpopular. Thereby he would leave fully intact the nationalization ofcoal, railways, civil
aviation, electricity, gas, and the Bank of England. The main social security provisions.
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the National Health Ser\ ice, and constitutional changes under Attlee such as the Second
Parliament Act were all left in place. Roy Jenkins suggests. What this Churchill
government essentially did was to give the country a rest from dogma and to relax the
acerbities of Crippsian austerity without setting the clock back on most of the work ofthe
-59

Attlee administration.

Churchill would maintain cordial relations with orgamzed labour. As previously
mentioned, appointing Walter Monckton as Minister of Labour helped to ease the
apprehension of the trade unionists. Jenkins suggests his appointment was “like ringing
up a signal that all differences would be split, all disputes would be arbitrated, and the
-60

seeds of the great inflation would be sown,

Returning to an earlier point, Churchill

had the utmost respect for trade union leaders provided they were patriotic. He would
reject the idea to re-enact the Trade Disputes Act of 1927, which prevented civil servants
from joining unions.^' In fact there w'as only one instance when the General Council of
the TUC came into real conflict with the government. The TUC demanded a meeting
with the Prime Minister in the summer of 1952 to discuss pay awards not automatically
confirmed by the government. In the end these awards would be confirmed and
62

unaltered.

Churchill listened intently to the demands ofthe TUC according to The

Times and reminded the group of his hand in creating protections for the lowest paid
worker. The politics of employment had always concerned Churchill, therefore when
unemployment looked to exceed half a million in June of 1952 he appointed a committee
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to create jobs for public works yet fortunately did not have to act as the numbers quickly
63

went down.

Although little legislation concerning social reform occurred during Churchill s
second administration, it must be noted that his reserve in striking down prior moves
points to both his recognition of public will and his personal acceptance ofthe new
British welfare state. Roy Jenkins believes the central achievement of this government
was the restoration of the balance of British politics. He states that,“The late 1940s and
the 1950s, even more so than the age of Gilbert and Sullivan, were the time when every
child ‘That’s bom into the world alive was either a little Liberal [Laborite] or else a little
-64

Conservative.'

Churchill would tender his resignation to Queen Elizabeth II in April

1955 yet remain a Member of Parliament until 1964 with no major interjection involving
social refomi during this time.
When appraising the second premiership of Winston Churchill one must note the
distinct difference in the political context from that of his wartime leadership. It is Paul
Addison’s assumption that overall during this time Churchill was bored by domestic
affairs. It is worth noting that Churchill did rejoice over the matter of abolishing food
rations while supporting Macmillan’s housing programs and Monckton’s appeasement
65

policy towards the trade unions.

During World War II it is clear Churchill prioritized

the war effort over reform and reconstruction discussions. His second tenure at Number
10 however would be under entirely different circumstances, sitting as guardian of a
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newly completed reconstruction process. It is evident that Winston Churchill, in the end,
would prove to be an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary in respect to social reform.

89

Conclusion

The political career of Winston Churchill is a complicated story. On the surface it
appears that ChurchilFs political life was fiill ofinconsistencies and frequent acts made
for personal gain. Undoubtedly decisions were made due in part to the political climate
of his time and in a manner so as to wield the most influence possible. Nevertheless, it is
my contention that Churchill convinced himself that social reform was a necessity of
modem society and that the role of government was to provide for those who could not
provide completely for themselves. This is persistently shown beginning with his early
radical years, continuing into his middle career while serving as Chancellor ofthe
Exchequer, and enduring into his second Premiership by accepting the welfare state put
in place by the preceding Labour government.
Churchill’s subscription to his father’s “Tory Democracy” played an integral role
in his political ideology throughout his career. As the political context of Britain
changed, Winston Churchill himself adapted to these changes while maintaining
consistency in respect to social reform. The degree to which social reform measures
should be taken directly reflected his view of society as time progressed. At times he saw
revolutionary actions must be taken while other times a more evolutionary approach was
needed. Nevertheless, these thoughts and concerns regarding social reform were genuine.
Churchill’s ideas and actions were by no means original but they were affective and
valuable in providing both the foundation and evolution ofthe British social welfare
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state. His name cannot be omitted from the list of Twentieth Century social reformers.
Britain can attribute its perseverance and victory in World War II to his wartime
leadership but she cannot forget the role he also played in shaping her social structure.
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